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THE REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT AND CORPORATE
LAW REFORM IN MISSISSIPPI: PART
TWO
Wendell H. Holmes*
In the 1987 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature, a
new business corporation act for Mississippi (hereinafter New
MBCA) became a reality.1 The new law became effective Janu
ary 1, 1988.2 It is based almost entirely upon the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act (hereinafter RMA) and profoundly
changes much of the state's pre-existing corporate law. Part One
of this article,3 completed prior to the passage of the New
MBCA, discussed in detail the relationship of the provisions of
the RMA to the prior Mississippi Business Corporation Act
(hereinafter Old MBCA) and proposed changes in Mississippi

* Associ ate Profe
ssor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center; formerly As
sociate Professor of Law,
University of Mississippi. B.A. 1974, Millsaps College; J.D.
1977, Tul ane Univers
ity.
' Missis sippi Business Corporation Act, 1987 Miss. Laws Ch. 486 [hereinafter New
MBCA], codified at
Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 79-4-1.01 to-17.04 (Supp. 1987). The New
MBCA repeals the
former statute, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-1 to-293 (1972 and Supp.
1986) [herein after Old
MBCA] in its entirety.
• The New
MBCA is to a large degree an outgrowth of the work of the Business Law

Reform Task Force convened by Secretary of State Dick Molpus in July, 1986. The Task

�orce undertook to

draft proposed legislation to replace the existing business corpora

tion, nonprofit corporation, professional corporation, limited partnership, and securities
acts. The author was a member of the Task Force and of the subcommittee responsible

for drafting the proposed business corporation act. The views expressed in this article
are �ol ely tho
se of the author and do not represent in any way those of any other person
affilia ted with
the Task Force.
Among the other
legislation that was generated by the Task Force is a new nonprofit
c�rp� r ation
act which closely parallels the New MBCA. This act is labeled the Missis
sip pi Non profi
t Corporation Act, 1987 Miss. Laws Ch. 485, codified at Miss. CoDI;: ANN.
§§ 79-11-101 to-3
99 (S upp. 1987).
• Holmes,
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act and Corporate Law Re
.
form in
Miss issip pi: Part One, 56 Miss. L.J. 165 (1986) [hereinafter Part One).
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law (including substantial revisions to much o f the RMA)4 in the
areas of corporate formation and organization, and corporate
management and governance. That work now serves as the au
thor's critique of the New MBCA regarding those topics.5 The
methodology of Part Two of this article will, logically, be some
what different from that o f Part One. Whereas the earlier in
stallment was primarily an analysis of existing Mississippi law
with proposals for revision (using the RMA as the point of de
parture for the revision process), this Part will undertake a criti
cal analysis of the New MBCA in those areas not covered in
Part One: capitalization, shareholder litigation, organic changes,
and the problems of the closely-held business.
I.

A.

CAPITALIZATION

Par Value, Stated Capital, and Distributions

By far the most revolutionary aspect of the New MBCA (at
least in contrast to traditional Mississippi pract ice) is section
6.40.8 In one swift motion, the concepts of par value, stated capi

tal, earned surplus, capital surplus, and treasury stock were
swept from the corporate statutes. The approach of the New
MBCA to these areas is particularly striking in light of some
highly idiosyncratic provisions of prior Mississippi law.
Specifically, under the Old MBCA, the minimum permissi
ble par value of stock was $1.00.7 Moreover, while no-par stock
was ostensibly permitted, any practical advantage o f the concept
was undercut by the statute's insistence that the issue price of
no-par stock not be less than $1.00.8 Thus the raison d'etre of
no-par stock, i.e., the elimination of "watered stock" liability,

• It might be noted that
Part One was completed prior to the finalization of the
work of the Task Force.
• The New MBCA uses
the same numerical system as the RMA, resulting in easy
c oss- eference. In addition, while the New MBCA
� �
(as is typic a l of Mississippi legisla
tion) includes no published comment ary and
little legislative history, the Official Com
ments to the RMA should c onstitute persuasiv e
authority regardi n g the interpretation of
the new act.
• See New MBCA,
supra note 1, § 6.40. The new act adopts without change the
correspondin g provision of the RMA. REVISE
D MODEL BUSINESS CoRP AcT § 6.40 (1984).
7 Old MBCA, supra
note 1, § 33.
•Id.
·
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was completely defeated.• These aspects of the Old MBCA de
prived corporate planners, arguably without justification,10 of a
substantial degree of flexibility in matters involving a corpora

tion's stock structure. 11
Criticism of the par value concept has long been wide
spread, and the breach in the dam occurred in 1975 when Cali
fornia eliminated the requirement of a statement o f par value of
authorized shares.12 The ABA Committee on Corporate Laws
took up the torch in 1979, 18 and its approach was reflected in the
RMA and, correspondingly, by the New MBCA.
The mere elimination of par value, however, might not ap
pear at first blush to be that significant of a change. It is only in
its relation to the question of dividends and distributions that
its true importance is manifested.
The Old MBCA was a traditional "earned surplus" stat
ute.14 Under its provisions, t he par value of shares issued with a
par value, or (absent any contrary allocation by the board of di
rectors) the f ull consideratio n for no-par shares was committed
• For d iscussion
of this issue under the Old MBCA, see Hodge & Perry, The Model
Business Corporation Act:
Does The Mississippi Version Lime The Bushes?, 46 Miss.
L.J. 371, 380-81 (1975) (hereinafter Hodge & Perry] (liability of shareholder for watered

stock).

10 The historic al rationale for the concept o f par value has generally been twofold: to
�ure equitable contributions among shareholders by requiring that they pay a standard
price ("p ar") for their shares;
and to provide a "cushion" of capital to which creditors of
corporation would have
recourse. See B. MANNING, A C ONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LBGAL
APITAL 19, 22 (2d ed.
1981) [hereinafter MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL] (general background
develop ment of
legal capital concept). That neither premise applies today is clear.
� der cur rent practice par value establishes only the minimum, not the actual, issue
Pnc� �f shares. In addition,
even under statutes such as the Old MBCA which prescribed
minimum cap
ital contribution as a condition of doing business, the amount mandate d
nerall 1 ) was insuffic
1
y $ 000
ient to provide any meaningful protection to creditors. See
BCA, supra note l, §
111; Hodge & Perry, supra note 9, at 379.

�he
�

�
J� �

See Hodge & Perry,
supra note 9, at 381-82.
1975 Cal. Stat. 682, § 7,
codified at CAL. CoRP. CooE § 202(d)(e).
Committee on Corp
u
orate Laws Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act
Amend ments to
· after p·mancia
· l
Financial Provisions, 34 Bus LAW. 1867 (1979) (herem
.
Pr v..
isions] (amendments and comments of committee). The proposed changes were fi
12

·

-

'

� o
Cha� ?sP� ved for inclusion in the Model Act in 1980. Commit
35
n

g

tee ?n �rp orate
m th e Model Busi ness
Financial Prov1Sions,
to
dments
Corporation Act-Amen

8,�8· LAw.

note

-�ws,

1365 (1 980).
F or a general
discussion of such statutes, see MANNING, LEG AL CAPITAL, supra
10, at 7275.
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to stated capital.111 The excess, if any, became capital surplus.
Under ordinary circumstances, capital surplus could not be dis
tributed to shareholders. Rather dividends (cash or property)
could be paid only out of the "unreserved and unrestricted
earned surplus"18 of a corporation, defined basically as the "bal
ance of its net profits, income, gains and losses."11 In contrast,
distributions (cash or property) from capital surplus18 were pro
hibited absent authorization in the articles of incorporation or
by two-thirds of the shareholders, and were subject to other con
ditions involving the protection of senior security holders.19
This much of the Old MBCA was representative of most
earned surplus statutes; the exact parameters of a corporation's
discretion in these matters was, however, clouded by an addi
tional, non-uniform provision of the Old MBCA specifically
prohibiting cash dividends unless paid out of unreserved and
unrestricted earned surplus.20 As previously discussed in some

11

See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 39. If no-par shares were issued, at least $1.00 per
share was required to be allocated to stated capital. Id.
11

Id. § 83(a).
Id. § 3(m). Stock dividends, however, could be issued out of any treasur y shares

17

reacquired out of surplus (pres um ab ly earned or capital), and out of authorized but unis

sued shares so long as appropriate amounts of "any unreserved and unrestricted surplus"
were transferred to stated ca pita l. Id. § 83(c), (d).
" Id. § 3(1), (n). "Surplus" was defined as "the excess of the net assets of a corpora
tion over its stated capital." "Capital surplus" was "the entire surplus of a corporation
other than ts earned surplus." Id. Functionally, capital surplus generally represented
the excess (1f any) of the issue price of shares over their par value.

�

• • Id. § 85. Neither dividends nor distributions from capital surplus could be made
.
if the corporation was insolvent or would thereby be rendered insolvent.

�

T e use of the label "distributions" was, of course, a distinction without a differ

e� c e, since the economic effects on shareholders and the corporation were identical in
either event; o nl y the nature of the accounting transaction involved was in any way
affected.
so

Id. § 87. The full text of the statute was as follows:
Anything to the contrary in this chapter notwithstanding, the board of direc
r� of a corporation shall never declare, nor shall a corporation pay, a cash

�

dlVldend unless such dividend is out of the unreserved and unrestricted earned
s�r plus only of sue cor��ati on and has been legal y appropria e d for the spe
t
l
cific purpose of paymg d1v1dends; provided further that
dividend shall

�

no such
. .
be declared or paid when th e corpora t'ion 1s
insolvent or when the pa yme nt
thereof would render the corporat'ion insolvent
or when such p a ym ent wou ld
'

·
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detail in Part One, the full import of this additional restriction,
particularly on the ability of a corporation to make cash distri
butions from capital surplus, has never been clear. 11 Unless one
were willing to rely upon the frankly artificial bifurcation of
"dividends" and "distributions,"21 the Old MBCA made any
such cash distributions of dubious legality. 21
The drafters of the RMA recognized the irrationality of the

earned surplus test as a device for protecting creditors and sen
ior security holders from payments to junior s ecurity holders.
Thus, in addition to eliminating the concepts of stated capital
and par value, they subjected distributions to shareholders to
the sole restriction of insolvency,34 at the same time consolidat
ing under the classification "distributions" transactions previ
ously denominated as dividends, distributions, share repur
chases, redemptions, and distributions in liquidation.

Thus, under section 1.40 of the New MBCA, a "distribu
tio n" is d efined as "a direct or indirect transfer of money or
other property (except its own shares) or incurrence of indebted
ness by a corporation to or for the be nefit of its shareholders,"
and may take the form of "a declaration or payment of a divi-

be contrary to any provisions in the articles of incorporation. Nothing in this

Id.

chapter shall impair or prevent a legal distribution to shareholders upon liqui
datio n or d issolution as provided in this chapter.
•• See Hodge & Perry, supra
note 9, at 377-79.
22
See note 19 supra.

•• The statute
could be circumvented however either by a redemption of stock out
of capital surp
lus, or possibly by a prope y (in ki d) distribution. See Hodge & Perry,
supra note 9, at 378-79.

:i

�

" See 1 MOD EL
.
BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 484 (3d ed. 1985) (annotation notes that
insolve ncy rest
riction was significant limitation on distributions); Financial Provisions,
supr� note 13, at
1867-68 (supporting adoption of more rigid stated capital
req uir ement
s).

It should be noted
that this response to the inadequacy of stated capital provisions
.
is
not an ine vita ble
one; arguments have been advanced that the proper approac h would
be the a dop
tion of a more realistic minimum amount of stated capital which could not be
du ced. See, e.g.,
Note, The Inadequacy of Stated Capital Requirements, 40 U. C1N. L.
823, 8 41 (1971)
(article uses trust fund theory approach to justify increased stated
CSE�.
Pita! r equir e
ments) . In effect this adopts the "trust fund" concept of Wood v. Dum
er, 30 F.
Cas. 435 (No. 17,944)(C.C.D. Me. 1824). The logistical difficulties in both
ormulating
tha t "realistic" amount and in policing its maintenance make this a some
what utopi
an propos al.
·

�

�

·
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o f shares; a
dend; a purchase, redemption or other acquisition
11
"2
distribution of indebtedness; or otherwise.
The heart of the financial provisions, however, is section
the cor
6.40. Under subsection (a), the board may authorize and
to
poration may make distributions to shareholders s ubject only
The
(c).
the restrictions of the articles (if any) and of subsec tion

statutory restriction adopts the twofol d standard of equity and
balance sheet solvency.28 Thus, a distribution cannot be made if,
after giving effect to it, the corpora tion cannot pay its debts as
and when they became due (insolvency in the equity sense) or
the corporation's total assets will be less than its total liabilities,
together with the amount required to satisfy the liquidation
rights of senior security holders (insolvency in the balance sheet

sense).27
The obvious merit of the new scheme is the flexibility it
provides to corporate managers. Ironically, this flexibility may
engender the criticism that the new system gives inadequ ate
guidance to directors, many of whom (particularly in the closely
held corporation which is the norm in Mississippi) may lack the
requisite financial sophistication to make the judgments that the
statute demands.
Such criticisms are addressed only in part by the statute.
Section 6.40(d) allows directors to rely upon financial statements
prepared on the basis of accounting practices which are reason a
ble under the circumstances, on a fair valuation, o r any other
method reasonable under the circumstances. 28 The matter of

16

New MBCA, supra note 1, § 1.40(6).
See Financial Provisions, supra note 13, at 1868.
"
27 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.40(a),(c). Under the Old MBCA,
"insolve ncy
meant only equity insolvency. See, e.g., Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 3(o).
It should be n ted that § 6.40 of the RMA has already been subject to an official
�
amendment rega dmg the determination of insolvency. Under that amendment, codified
�
a�§ ·40 g), any mdebtedness which by its terms can only be repaid to the extent tha t a
distribution could be made is not treated as a liability under§ 6.40(c). See Committee on
C�r�orate La s, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act
�
- A mendments Per
21

? �

taining to Distr ibutions, 42

Bus. LAW. 259 (1986), 42 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1987) (am end
ments and comments). This amendment was adopted
in Mississippi i n 1988. Miss. CooE
ANN. § 79-4-6.40(g)(Supp. 1988).
" This terminology deliberatelY om1 ts "
·
an d
· re1erence to technical accountmg
Jargon
·
.
specific concepts such as " generallY
·
accepted accounting prmciples." REVISED Moo EL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.40 Official Comm
ent 4 (1984).
·

·
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timing is governed by subsection (e), under which the effect of a
distribution is determined in most cases as of the date of author
ization, or the date of payment if more than 1 20 days after au
thorization. 29 In all other respects the statute is silent as to fac
tors that should guide the board's determination of whether
solvency (particularly in the equity sense) will be impaired; due
to the absence of any substantial case authority, the Official
Comments to the RMA provide the only persuasive guidance on
this issue.so In any event, while under new section 8.33, adopted
in 1988, consenting directors are expressly subjected to personal
liability for illegal distributions, that liability is enforced only to
the extent that the director's conduct violates the duty of care
embodied in section 8.30 of the New MBCA and is not shielded
by the business judgment rule. si Thus, most misjudgments will
20

Se e New MBCA, supra, 1, § 6.40(e)(3 ). Special rules are stated for distributions
by purchase, redemption or other acquisition of shares, in which case the operative date
is the earlier of the date money or property ie transferred or debt ie incurred, or the date
the shareholder ceases to be a shareholder with respect to the acquired shares; and for
other distributions of indebtedness, in which case the operative date is the date of distri·
bution. Id. § 6.40(e)(l)-(2). This provision resolves the conflict posed in cases such as
Williams v. Nevelow, 513 S.W. 2d 535 (Tex. 1974), in which the court held that for a
corporation repurchasing shares in exchange for an installment promissory note, solvency
was to be determined as of the time of the issuance of the debt instrument, not as of the
time of each subsequent installment payment on the debt. The New MBCA embraces
the rule of Williams.

30 REVI SED MODEL BUSINE SS CoRP. AcT § 6.4 0 Official Comment 2 (1984). The com
ments stat e that decisions
involving equity insolvency should be "based on a cash flow
analysis that is itself
based
on a business forecast and budget for a sufficient period of
.
tim
e to permit a conclusion that known obligations of a corporation can reasonably be
exp ecte d to be satisfi
ed over the period of time that they will mature." Id . Reliance
�lely upon a comparison of current assets to current liabilities, or of the present liquida
t�on value of
assets to existing liabilities, is eschewed. Id. In any event, the same deci
sions were requ
ired under the Old MBCA, which adopted the equity insolvency test. Old
MBC A supra note
l, § 3(o).
81
Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-4·8.33 (Supp. 1988). The same result would have obtained
under the New
MBCA as originally enacted. See Financial Provisions, supra note 13, at
1882· The new
statute adds express rights of contribution against other culpable direc
tors and shareho
lders who accepted the distribution knowing of the violation (which in
cl�des violations
of the articles). Id. § 79-4-8.33(b). Any action must be commenced
within two years
of the date determined by § 6.40(c) or (g). Id. § 79-4-8.33(c).
Section 8.3 0 of the New MBCA is identical to its counterpart in the RMA; for an
ex tensive disc
ussion of those provisions and the related business judgment rule, see Part
On e supra
note
3, at 188-202. Of course, any decision tainted by self-dealing would be
'.
outside of the pro
tection afforded by § 8.30.
,
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not be actionable.

B.

Shares

Corresponding to the changes involving par value and re
lated concepts, the New MBCA differs substantially from its
predecessor in its treatment of authorized shares. The New
MBCA contains no reference to the traditional classification of
"common" and "preferred" shares. Rather, the statute mandates
only that there be at least one class of stock with unlimited vot
ing rights, and at least one class of stock which is entitled to
receive the net assets of the corporation in dissolution. 32 If more
than one class of stock is authorized then the articles must pre
scribe a distinguishing designation for shares ( which, presuma
bly, could include the terms common or preferre d ) but no legal
significance is attached to the nomenclature used. 33 Rather, of
paramount importance under the New MBCA is the statement
of preferences, limitations and relative rights contained in the
articles - in the words of the Official Comments to the RMA,
the "contract" between the owners of these shares and the cor
poration with respect to their interests.3" Except as permitted
for series of shares all shares of a class must have identical
rights.35 As under the Old MBCA provisions on preferred stock,
the variable rights and preferences permitted by the statute
(which declares itself nonexclusive) include voting rights,38 re-

" New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.0 l ( b ) . Of course these rights may be cons olidated
in one class.
u Id. § 6.0l(a). A possible exception to this is suggested by the RMA Comm ents,
which state that if the fundamental rights of voting and residual equity interest are re
posed in a single class of stock, that class may be described as simply "common shares."

REVISED MooEL Bus1NEss CORP. ACT § 6.01 Official Comment 1 ( 1 984).
u REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §6.01 Official Comment 1 (1984).
'" See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.0l(a).
•• Id. § 6.0l(c)(l). It should be noted that, as originally a dopted, the New MBCA
would not have permitted nonvoting common stock pursuant to the m andate of Miss.
CONST . �rt. 7, § 194. On November 10, 1987, the ele�torate approved Senate Concurrent
Resolution No. 550 of the 1987 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature which re
peale? � 194. The original language of the New MBCA made nonvoting common stock
perm1ss1ble unless prohibited by§ 194. New MBCA, supra, note 1, § 6.0l(c)(l). The 1988
amendments to the New MBCA now simply sanction nonvoting shares generally. Miss.
CODE A NN . § 79-4-6.0l(c)(l) (Supp. 1988).

1987]
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demption or conversion features,37 and dividend and liquidation
preferences. 38 As was true under the Old MBCA, 811 the new stat
ute provides for the issuance of classes of shares in series (so
called "blank stock") under which the board of directors, if so
authorized by the articles of incorporation, can define the pre
cise terms of each series by appropriate amendment to the arti
cles at the time of issuance. •0
As under the former statute,'1 the New MBCA permits the
issuance of fractional shares or scrip.42 Holders of fractional
shares have voting and proprietary rights; holders of scrip do not
in the absence of contrary provision. The major innovation in
the new law is that the board is now given the option of paying a
shareholder the monetary value of fractional shares, or to "ar
range for disposition of fractional shares," in addition to the is
suance of fractional shares or scrip.43
As previously noted,44 among the traditional corporate law
notions abandoned by the New MBCA is that of treasury
shares. '6 The drafters of the RMA concluded that the distinc
tion between treasury shares and authorized but unissued shares
was both unnecessary and, from many perspectives, undesir-

•• Id. § 6.0l(c)(2). The New MBCA changes existing law in this regard in one signifi
cant respect. Under the Old MBCA the right to redeem shares was limited to the option
of the corporation. Old MBCA, supra note 1,§ 27(a). Under the New MBCA redemption

may be authorized at the option of the shareholder, another person, or upon the occur
rence of a designated condition. New MBCA supra note 1, § 6.0l(c)(2). Moreover, the
price at which conve
rsion or redemption is to occur may either be fixed by the articles, or
may be determin ed by the
use of a designated formula or by reference to ex trinsic data
or sources. Id.
at § 6.0l(c)(l-2).

.. See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.0l(c)(3), (4).
See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 29.
.��e New. MBCA, supra note I, § 6.02. In this

••

fashion, t he board "fills in the
'0
.
b.1anks ID p
reviously authorized shares. Such amendments require no shareholder actio n. Id. at §
6.02(d)(4).
Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 45.

" See
See New MBCA, supra
42

note 1, § 6.04.
Id. § 6.04(a)(l),(2). The "cash out" option is frequently employed in "going pri
vate" tr ansa
ction s. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 6.04 Official Comment (1984).
" s supra text accompanyin g notes 6 and 7.
••

0

ee
See Old MBCA supra note 1, § 3(i). Those shares that were issue? but reacquired

b the corp
orat ion, and were held by the corporation rather than bem g cancelled or
Y
re stor e d to
the status of authorized but unissued shares were considered issued but not
ou tsta n ding.
Id. See also New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6 .01(2) .
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able. 46 Thus, under the New MBCA, shares acquired by the cor
poration are deemed to be authorized but unissued shares unless
the articles prohibit their reissuance; in that event they are can
celled, and the statute permits the directors to file without
shareholder action an amendment to the articles reflecting the
decrease in the number of authorized shares."7 Since the eco
nomic effect of the transaction is essentially that of a distribu
tion of corporate assets, any reacquisition is within the defini
tion of distribution and subject to the restrictions of section
6.40. 48
Together with the elimination of par value, stated capital
and surplus, the New MBCA substantially modifies the rules in
volving the consideration for issuance of shares and its alloca
tion. The Old MBCA, like most traditional statutes, limited the
permissible consideration for shares to money, tangible or intan
gible property, or services actually performed; promissory notes
were specifically prohibited. The judgment of the board as to the
value of consideration received was conclusive absent fraud.49
Substantially greater flexibility is provided under the new
act, which adds promissory notes, contracts for future services,
and other securities of the corporation to the roster of eligible
forms of consideration.60 The board is required to determine the

0

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.31 Official Comment (1984).

" See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.31.

•• See New MBCA, supra note 1, §§ 1.40(6), 6.40; RE VISED MODEL BUSINESS COR P.
ACT§ 6.31 Official Comment (1984). See also supra notes 6, 28 and accompanying text.
Under the Old MBCA shares could be repurchased only out of earned surplus, by article
authorization or two-thirds approval of shareholders, or capital surplus. Old MBCA,
supra note 1, § 9. Exceptions existed for purchases made to eliminate fractional shares,
collecting or compromising debts, payments under dissenters' rights, and redemption or
purchase to return redeemable shares. Id. § 9 (a-d). Under the New MBCA the twofold
insolvency test would be the sole limitation on any reacquisition. See, e.g., New MBCA,
supra note 1, § 6.40(c).
" See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 35.
•• See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.2l(b).
An exception was made in the 1987 act
f?� transportation corporations, due to a constitutional limitation applicable to such en
tities for money, property actually received, or labor done (or in good faith agreed to be
done). Miss. C ONST art. 7,§ 195 ; New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.2l(F). Senate Concur
_
rent Resolution No. 548 of the 1987 Regular Session of the Mississip Legislature, re
pi
_
pealing§ 195, was approved by the electorate on November 10, 1987.
A n amendment was
_
adopted m 1988 to the statute to remove the special rule stated
in § 6.21. Miss. CODE
ANN. § 79-4-6.21 (Supp. 1988). The statute p rovides for protective mechanisms, such as
.
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value of consideration received or to be received but only for the
purpose of determining that the shares are validly issued, fully
paid and nonassessable; its determination is declared conclusive
for these purposes.111 The "fraud" standard placed on the discre
tion of the board is eliminated; liability for improper issuance of
shares is thus governed by the ordinary duty of care of section
8.30 and the conflict of interest provisions of section 8.31.112
Due to the elimination of the par value and stated capital
concepts, the board is no longer required to allocate considera
tion received for shares to "stated capital" and "surplus" ac
counts,113 as was mandated by prior law.11•
As under prior law,1111 a shareholder's liability is limited to
the agreed consideration under section 6.20 or as provided in a
subscription agreement;116 the new statute also expressly insu
lates shareholders from personal liability for corporate obliga
tions except those for which his own conduct creates liability.117
The New MBCA also makes an important change in prior
law dealing with stock options. Under the Old MBCA any option
issued as a means of compensation to directors, officers, employ
ees or subsidiaries, not part of a general issuance to other share-

dePosit of shares in escrow, when shares are issued for notes or future services. Id. §
6.21( e).
51 Id. § 6.2l(c),(d).
51 R EVISE D MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ac:r § 6.21 Official Comment (1984).
aa
Id. Of course the statute does not prohibit the use of such categories as an accounting matter, if the board desire s. Id.
54 See Old MBCA, supra note 1,
§ 39.
aa
Id. § 47.
"" New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.20. These provisions d o not substantially deviate
from the prior statute. See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 31.
57 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.22. The statute does permit, however, the
imp ositio n of such liability by a provision in the articles. Id. §§ 2.02(b)(2)(v), 6.22(b).
The New MBCA, then, eliminates any potential for "watered stock" liability based
sol ely upon the issuance
of shares below an artificially determined price. Rather,
p ro blems of overr
eaching, unfairness or unequal treatment are now placed under the
broader penumbra of the
board's fiduciary obligations. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT.§ 6.21 Official
Comment (1984); Financial Provisions, supra note 13, at 1879.
A special rule permits the issuance of shares to existing shareholders without consid
eration (i.e., as a stock
dividend or stock split) so long as this is done on a pro rata basis,
and such issuance does
not dilute the interests of a class of stockholders without their
approval. See, e.g., New
MBCA, supra note l, § 6.23(a)(b).
It sho uld be noted that, in all events, the sole power to issue stock can be reserved to
the share holders in
the articles. Id. § 6.21(a).
•
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holders, required the approval of a majority of shareholders.H
This provision was an indefensible restriction on the board's dis
cretion, given the widespread acceptance of incentive compensa
tion plans, and extrinsic rules requiring their d isclosure in most
public companies.119 Thus the New MBCA deletes the require
ment of shareholder approval altogether, rendering the matter
one of business judgment and fiduciary duty of the board.80

C.

Preemptive Rights

As under prior law,81 the New MBCA makes preemptive
rights62 elective; that is, they d o not exist unless so pro vided in
the articles.63 The Old MBCA did not, howe ver , address the con
tent of preemptive rights if o nly the mere election to provide
them was made; with little Mississippi case law to consult for
guidance one would have to divine the e ffect of the grant of
"preemptive rights" from other common law authority.8• Section
6.30 of New MBCA, which statutorily de fines the presumptive
effect of preemptive ri ghts, is ar guably an improvement over the
silence of its predecessor. However, it erects traps for the un
wary that should be carefully scrutinized by planners.
Speci fically, under the New MBCA, a statement that the
corporation elects preemptive ri ghts, without any e xpress provi
sion to the contrary, will not entitle shareholders to e xercise pre08

See
.. See

Old MBCA, supra note l, § 37.
17 C . F . R . § 240.14a-101 (1987)(disclosure of compensation plans in pro xy
statements of corporations registered under § 12(g) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
Moreover, as the comments to the RMA point out, approval may be required by
stock ex change rules. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 6.24 Official Comment
(1984).

••
�·
11

See
See

New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.24.

Old MBCA, supra note l, § 49.
I.e., the right of existing shareholders to acquire their proportionate share of any
new issuance of stock before sales to others. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPO
RATIONS § 174 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter HENN & ALEXANDER]. See New MBCA, supra
note l, § 6.30.

••

See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.30.
The gen�rally accepted view was that preemptive rights did not attach to trea sury
shares, shares issued for non-cash consideration, or shares
issued in connection with a
merger or consolidation; a split of authority existed
as to whether they applied to origi
nally authorized but unissued shares. See HENN & ALEXANDE
R supra note 62 § 174, at
�fil
14

•

'
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emptive rights with respect to (a) shares issued
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as

compensation

to directors, officers, agents, employees, subsidiaries or affiliates,

or to satisfy conversion o r option rights created as compensation
to any of those persons; (b) originally authorized shares issued

within six months of incorporation; and (c) shares issued for
consideration other than money (e.g., property or services).H
Moreover, preemptive rights are denied to shares with limited
voting rights but preferential distribution rights; shares with
general voting rights but n o preferences have no rights to shares
with preferences unless t hose shares are
without preferences.68 Finally, if shares
rights are not acquired by shareholders,
third parties for a period o f one year at a

convertible into shares
subject to preemptive
they can be offered to
price not less than that

at which they were offered to the shareholder; an offer at a lower
price or after one year again invokes the preemptive right.67
Preemptive rights generally are not utilized in the public
corporation arena but are frequently encountered as a protective
device for minority shareholders in closely-held corporations.68
This being the case, it must be noted that the New MBCA cre
ates various avenues whereby a majority interest can effectively
avoid the right-for example, by issuing shares as compensation

to a majority director or officer or by issuing shares for property
or services. While any such action taken as an oppressive mea
sure could trigger liability for breach of fiduciary duty/111 lengthy
and expensive litigation may be necessary on the shareholder's
part to assert the right t o maintain his proportionate position.
Thus, planners representing minority shareholders should con-

0

See

New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.30 (b)( 3).
•• Id. § 6.30(b )(4)-( 5).
87 Id. § 6.30(b)(6). It should also be noted that preemptive rights can be waived
without con side
ration. Id. § 6.30(b)(2).
•• R. CLAR K, CORPORATE LAW § 17.1.4 (1986) [hereinafter CLARK].
47 ••
Katzowitz v. Sidler, 24 N.Y.2d 512, 515, 249 N.E.2d 359, 364, 301 N.Y.S.2d
•

See

77
and
0969)(off er of shares at 1/18 of book value without valid busines s purpose
_o, 4
with int ent
to dilute interest of d issenting shareho lder held breach of fiduciary duty).
cf. Ma sure v.
Osborne, 388 Pa. 121, 130 A.2d 157, 159 (1957)(book value not conclu
sive of mark
et value; offer to plaintiff was prima facie evidence of good faith). Of course,
ree mptive rig
hts often give a minority shareholder nothing more than the option of
P
thr owing
his money down a bottomless well· thus other structural protections should be
con sidered
by representatives of such inter sts.

�ut

�
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sider the inclusion of appropriate provisions in the articles to
broaden the scope of preemptive rights and narrow the statutory
loopholes.
II.

SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION

Prior Mississippi law contained only one brie f statutory ref
erence and virtually no case authority70 on the subject of share
holders' derivative actions.71 The only reference in the Old
MBCA was section 93, which incorporated the contemporaneous
ownership requirement, i.e., that only one who was a shareholder
at the time the challenged transaction took place could file a de
rivative suit.72 The statute's silence was particularly maddening
since the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure failed to adopt
Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with
derivative actions.78 Thus the New MBCA provisions on deriva
tive suits bring welcome clarification to this area of Mississippi
law; nonetheless it is only fair to say that the new s tatute leaves
unanswered a number of significant questions.
Section 7.40 of the New MBCA was adopted without change
from the RMA. Two prerequisites exist to maintaining a deriva
tive action: first, as under the prior statute, the plaintiff must
have been a shareholder (either of record or beneficial owner) as

The sole annotated case is Liberty Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mitchell, 398 S o. 2 d 20 8

'0

(Miss. 1981), which while derivative in nature involved no typical derivative action is
sues. Of course such a dearth of case authority on corporate issues in Mississippi is
hardly unique. See Part One, supra 3, at 168.

71 For useful general background, see CLARK, su pra note 68, §§ 15.l - 15.10. See also
HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 62 § 358-81.
12

The text of the statute read as follows:
No action shall be brought in this state by a sharehol der in the right of a
domestic or foreign corporation unless the plaintiff was a holder of shares or of
voting trust certificates therefor at the time of the transaction of which he

complains, or his shares or voting trust certificates thereafter devolved upon
him by operation of law from a person who was a holder at such time.
Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 93. In contrast, the 1969 Model Act also provide d for 1 )
(
�ayr:n ent to the defe � dant by plaintiff of reasonable expenses upon final judgment an d a
tindmg that the action was brought without reasonable cause,
and (2) security for ex

penses. MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT § 49 (1969). For a detailed discussion of the contem·
poraneous ownership requirement, see Harbrecht, The Contempor neous Ownership
a

Rule

in

Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1041 (1978).

�E �. �·

Civ. P. 23.1. Since the federal rule would apply in the federal courts of
.
Mississi
ppi, it was, however, the most likely authority to be
applied by analogy.
,.
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of the time of the challenged transaction or have received his
shares by operation of law from such an owner7'; and second, the
complaint, which must be verified,76 must allege with particular
ity those e fforts made to obtain action by the board and their
refusal to act, or why the failure to take such action should be
excused.76 Like most statutes , however, the New MBCA is un
fortunately silent on the issue of what constitutes "demand fu
tility," a matter on which a substantial body of often contradic
tory case law exists. 77 The new statute empowers the court to
stay any action pending a n i nvesti gation by the corporation. 78
A matter of great practical significance to shareholders' at
torneys is that the New MBCA, unlike the statutes of several
major states, 79 makes n o provision for security for expenses as a
prerequ isite to suit.80 Rather, abusive or vexatious litigation is
deterred by the potential for an award of the defendant's rea
sonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, if the court on ter
min ation (not "final judgment") finds that the suit was brought

" See

New MBCA, supra note 1 , § 7.40 (a), (e).
70 Id. § 7 .40(b). This requirement, i mported from Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1, has been held
� req uire only that the
plaintiff have a good faith belief in the accuracy of the allega
tions made , notwiths
tanding his failure to understand the complaint. Surowitz v. Hilton

Hotels Corp. , 383 U.S 363,
373 ( 1966), reh. denied, 384 U.S. 9 1 5 (1966).
.
See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 7.40(b) . Unlike the Federal Rules, no reference
78
1� made to necessity for demand on shareholders a prerequisite applied in a few jurisdic
,
tions. See, e g
. . , Solomon & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp.,
93 N.E.2d 241, 248
(Mass. 1950) (if demand on officer fails, then other shareholders must
be served demand). The Federal
Rules require such demand only "if necessary," presum
ably under the
substantive law of the state, and like the RMA most modem statutes
•

adopt no such require
ment. A collection of cases on the issue may be found at 2 REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT ANN. 741-43 (3rd ed. 1985).

77 For a useful summary
of recent cases on point, see 2 REVISED MonEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT ANN
. 737-41 (3d ed. 198 5).
78
7

0

See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 7.40
S ee, e.g ., C AL. CoRP. CoDE § 800 (c) - (O

(b) .
(West 1977

& Supp. 1987)(motion for se
curi y allowe
d if no benefit to corporation or shareholders, or if moving party was not
.
ti cipant in
transaction); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1986) (corporation en1 ed to sec .
urity from plaintiffs). Currently eighteen states have such statutes. 2 REVISED
ODEL BUSIN
ESS CORP. AcT ANN. 728 (3d. 1985). On the other hand, the Illinois Business
or rat ion
��
Act of 1983 makes no such provision. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § �.80 (1?85).
.
.
T he drafters of
the RMA took the position that such requirements d1scr1mmate
.
un�airly agai
nst the small shareholder and are inconsistent with other types of corporate
�ctions ( e.g.,
antitrust and class actions) that involve substantial litigation expense but
unpose no
similar impediment. REVISED MooEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.40 Official Com
ment l ( h) ( 1 984) .

r.�:
�

•

:
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without reasonable cause.81
8
New
As is true of most derivative action statutes, 2 the
or set
MBCA provides that such suits canno t be discontinued
discon
tled without court approval. Notice of any settlement or
the
tinuance, if approved, must be given to the shareholders if
court determines that their intere sts will be substantially
affected. 83
Perhaps the most troublesome omission in the New MBCA
(as in its source, the RMA) is the failure to deal with the effect
of a determination by the board of directors, or a special litiga
tion committee appointed by the board, that the pursuit of a
derivative claim is against the best interest of the corporation.
Substantial variance in approach to this issue exists among re

cent cases. The New York rule, establishe d by Auerbach v. Ben
nett,84 is that the trier of fact may examine the independence,
good faith, and diligence of the body recommend ing dismissal;
beyond this, the court will not second guess the merits of the
recommendation but will apply the business judgment rule. A
more complex approach is taken in Delaware where, unde r
Zapata Corporation v. Maldonado,85 the court is to apply a two-

•• See New MBCA supra note 1, § 7.40 (d). The comments to the RMA state that it
was deemed unnecessary to make reference to an award of attorney's fees to a succes sful
plaintiff, in light of the universal recognition of this right both legislatively and judi

cially. REVISED MoDEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 7.40 Official Comment l (i) ( 1 984).
11
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (court approval necessary for settlement); 2 REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 727
court approval).

(3d ed. 1985) (no compromise allowed without

aa
See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 7.40 (c). The statute does not prescribe who is to
bear the expense of such notice (which, obviously, could be considerable); the comments
to the RMA state that this is discretionary with the court. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CoRP. AcT § 7.40 Official Comment l(i) (1984).
84 47 N.Y. 2d 619, 633, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 ( 1 979 ) .
.. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981 ). The significance of Zapata has, however, been unde rcut

by t�o subsequent decisions. In Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) , the court
held m effect that demand on directors should b e excused only where, under the particu
l�r facts alleged by the plaintiff, a reasonable doubt exists as
to the independence of the
directors and the fact that the decision would be upheld by the business judg ment rule.
at �14. See Recent Decisions, Corporations - Derivative Action -- Demand Futi lity
IS Achi�ved by the Creation of a
Reasonable Doubt of Directorial Disinterest Through

�d.

All�g� tions of Factual Particularity, 55 Miss. L.J. 181, 194
(1985)(discuss ing Aro nso n
dec�s�on). Moreover, in Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d
1 184 (Del. 1985), the court uphe ld a
?ec191on by the trial judge to forego application of the second
tier "indepen dent busi ness
Judgment" review of Zapata, emphasizing that this
step was purely discretionary. 499
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step process. First, the court must review the good faith and in
dependence of the decisionmaker and the factual bases underly
ing its recommendation, as to which the corporation has the bur
den of proof. Secondly, assuming that the corporation meets this
burden, the court is to determine by applying its own business
judgment whether a motion to dismiss should be granted. 86
The drafters of the RMA simply sidestepped the issue, not
ing only that the law was "in state of flux" and should be al
lowed to develop judicially, with the possibility of an appropri
ate amendment to the RMA at a later date.87 Since the
resolution of this question may as a practical matter be the most
significant issue in many derivative actions, I would urge the
Mississippi Legislature to monitor closely the progress of the
RMA in this regard and to consider the early adoption of an
amendment to section 7.40 of the New MBCA to provide a clear
standard for our courts to apply.

III.

ORGANIC CHANGES

The New MBCA substantially alters e xisting laws in the
area of fundamental corporate changes. Those matters will be

A.2d at 1 192.

" Accord, Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
105 1 (1983) (business judgment rule does not apply when special litigation committee
recommends dismissal of
shareholder's derivative suit). For additional background see,
e.g., Block & Prus
sin, Termination of Derivative Suits Against Directors on Business
Judg men t Grou nds:
From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus. LAW. 1503, 1505-07 (1984) (only
exc used when board is
extremely self-interested); Block & Prussin, The Business Judg
ment Rule and
Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata ? , 37 Bus. LAW. 27, 35 (gen
eral discussion of demand
requirement); Brown, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and
the Special Liti
gation Committee, 43 U. PrIT. L. REv. 601, 610-19 (1982)(examination of
shareholder dem
and rule before Aronson) ; Chittur, Ventriloquism For Corporate Direc
tors to Termi
nate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit, 75 Nw.
U.L. REv. 96, 98-1
24 (1980)(emphasis on Auerbach and relative positions of directors,
hareholders and litigation
committees); Note, Special Litigation Committees: An Unelcome Solut
ion to Shareholders Demands, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 493-97 (examina
ti. on of busi
ness judgment rule and demand requirements with thorough analysis of rele
vant case law .
)
Yet another position was taken in Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336
N.W. 2d 709 (Io
wa 1983), which refused to recognize a board-appointed committee but
�uggested that the court itself might appoint a committee of disinterested and exper
ienced persons
to make a recommendation on the issue. Id.
E
87 R VISED MODEL Bus1NEss CoRP. Acr § 7.40 Official Comment 2(a) (1984).

:
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discussed here under the classifications of amendments to the
articles, sales of assets, corporate combinations, dissolution, and
dissenters' rights.

A.

Amendments to the Articles and Bylaws

In most respects, the New MBCA does not differ markedly
from the provisions of the Old MBCA.88 As under the prior law,
the articles can be amended to include any provision which
would have been permissible i n the original articles. In lieu of an
illustrative list of allowable amendments the new statute merely
states that existing shareholders have no property right in any
provision of the articles. 89 One innovation of the New MBCA is
a list of certain essentially technical amendments which can be
made by the directors without shareholder action.90 Among
these is one of significance to all Mississippi corporate practi
tioners: i.e., an amendment to extend the corporation's duration
if incorporated at a time when limited duration was required by
law.91 Now that the Mississippi Constitution has been amended
to delete the ninety-nine year limitation on corporate life,9 2
counsel should avail themselves of this opportunity to obtain the
privilege of perpetual existence. 93
The procedure for other article amendments is much the
same as the old statute: proposal by the directors and approval
by the shareholders at a meeting called for that purpose.94 The

••

See generally Old MBCA, supra note 1, §§ 115-129.

" See New MBCA, supra note, 1, § 10.01. Thus the statute rejects the "vested

rights" theory which some courts extrapolated from Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S.

(4

Wheat.) 518 (1819), requiring unanimous shareholder consent for

any article amendment. For background on this problem, see 3 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT ANN. 1 150-51 (3d ed. 1985); HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 62, § 340, at 95155. In any event the vested rights theory was constitutionally rejected in Mississippi. See
Miss. CoNsT. art. 7, § 178.
90

See New MBCA, supra note l, § 10.02.

Id. § 10.02(1).
"' 1987 Miss. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 549, amending Miss. CONST. art. 7,
••

§. I 78 (approved by the electorate November 10, 1987). This restriction was codified in
Old
BCA, su;:ra note 1, § 109. See also Part One, supra
note 3, at 172 n. 27.
Appropriate amendments to New MBCA § 3.02 and
§ 10.02 were enacted in 1988.
Miss. CooE ANN. §§ 79-4-3.02, 10 02 ( 1 )( Supp
1988).
••.. See New MBCA, supra note
1, § 10.03. The directors are called upon to "recom

�

-

mend

the amendment

to

.

.

the shareholders unless precluded from this by a conflict of
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major substantive deviatio n from prior law is that in the absence
of a contrary provision in the articles requiring a greater vote,
approval of the amendment requires only the vote of a majority,
rather than two-thirds, of the votes of each voting group911 enti
tled to vote thereon.96 The statute actually imposes a two-fold
test: if the amendment would not trigger dissenters' rights, then
affirmative majority of votes cast at a m eeting where a quo
rum was present would s uffice;" however, as to any voting group
for whom the amendment invokes dissenters' rights, a majority
of the outstanding shares of that group is also needed for
approval.98
an

As under prior law, the concept of class voting on amend
ments is preserved although under the designation of votes by
voting groups. This right is extended to shares with no general
voting rights if the rights o f such shares would be affected in one
of nine enumerated ways.99
The amendment once approved is effected by filing articles
of amendment with the Secretary of State, including prescribed
information concerning the text of the amendment and the vote
thereon. Consistent with the approach taken under the New
MBCA generally, the formal issuance of a "certificate of amend
ment " is eliminated. 100 Also as under prior law, the board can
restate the corporation's articles without shareholder action,1 01

interest or "othe r
special circumstances" which must be communicated to the sharehold
ers. The boar d may also
condition its submission "on any basis." Id. § 10.03 (b)-(c).
Prior to the issuance of shares either the board or incorporators have plenary power
to amend the articles
. Id. § 10.05.
90 The concept of voting groups is discussed i
Part One, supra note 3, at 235 - 36.
" See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 10.03(e). The statute also allows the board to
�ter the ordinary voting rights of shareholders by appropriately conditioning its submis
to the shareholders. Id.
§ 10.03(c). See also REVISED MODEL � USINESS ?ORP. ACT §
.
·03 Offic1al
Comment (1984)(examples of conditions commonly rmposed m order for
amend ment app
roval).
97 This is the customa
ry requirement for effective shareholder action, and treats abstenf ons as
i
such, not as negative votes. See Part One, supra note 3, at 233-34 (maJOrl"tY
of votes cast
is sufficient to indicate shareholder approval).
98 See New MBCA, supra note
1, § 10.03(e).
" Id. § 10.04.
100
See New MBCA supra note 1 § § 1 25(b) 2.03; Part One, supra note 3, at 173.
101
See New MBCA supra note i § io.07. This presupposes, of course, that the
restatement
contains no changes not previously approved by the shareholders; m sueh
event shareh
older approval must to that extent be obtained. Id. § 10.07(b).

n

��n

·

'

'

·
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and amendments pursuant to federal bankruptcy reorganization
proceedings require neither board nor shareholder action. 102
The provisions of the New MBCA on bylaw amendments
are substantially more detailed than those of the previous stat
ute and make at least one substantive change. Under the Old
MBCA, the power to adopt or amend bylaws rested exclusively
with the board absent a provision in the articles which "re
served" such power to shareholders.103 Conversely, under the
new statute the power to amend or repeal bylaws is essentially
coterminous between the board and stockholders. Indeed, the
New MBCA actually shifts the balance in favor o f the share
holders since the board's power may be limited either by an ex
clusive reservation in the articles to the shareholders, or by a
statement in any action by the shareholders amending or repeal
ing a bylaw which provides that the board may not thereafter
amend or repeal it.104
Unlike the prior law, the New MBCA deals e xpressly with
supermajority provisions for both shareholders and directors. If
authorized by the articles, shareholders may adopt or amend by
laws providing for a greater vote or quorum requirement than
imposed by statute. Such action requires compliance with the
greater of the existing or proposed requirements for quorum and
votes. Any such bylaw cannot be adopted, amended or repealed
by the board.1011 Bylaws dealing with supermajority requirem ents
for the board are treated differently: if adopted by the share
holders, only they can amend; if by the directors, either the diIOI
•••
104

?

Id. § 10.08.
See Old MBCA, supra note 1 , § 5 1 .
See New MBCA supra note 1 , § 10.20. Presumably the initial bylaws would be

a opted by the board absent contrary provision in the articles, alth oug h the act does not
directly address this question.
While there was some split of authority, the prevailing view under statutes like the
Old MBCA appeared to be that the shareholders retained inherent power to amend or
repeal bylaws. See 3 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 121 1 - 1 2 (3d 1985)(statu·
tory and case law background of shareholders rights to repeal or amend bylaws); HENN &

ALEXAND � R, suP_ra
power enjoyed

m.

�ote

62, § 133, at 308 & nn. 1 1 -12 (formulation of initial bylaws is

different jurisdictions by incorporators, shareholders or board). The

.
New M B C A eh m mates any ambiguity on this issue
•••

".

See New MBCA, supra note 1 , § 10.21. Thus for example, any attempt by share

�

holder � to amen an existing bylaw fixing a 75% vote requirement to reduce it to 50%
would itself require a 75% affirmative vote.
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rectors or shareholders can amend.106

B.

Sales of Assets

The Old MBCA followed the traditional statutory approach
of requiring shareholder approval (by a two-thirds majority) of
the "sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposi
tion" of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets other
than in the ordinary course of business. 107 The New MBCA
changes this in three substantial respects.
First, the board is authorized to mortgage or otherwise en
cumber all or substantially all assets, either in or out of ordinary
course of business, without shareholder action (unless required
by the articles).108 This i s clearly a salutary change; matters of
corporate financing (as opposed to the disposition of all or the
bulk of a corporation's property) should appropriately be dele
gated to the board's discretion, subject only to the restrictions of
the duties of care and loyalty. 1 09
Secon d, transfers to a wholly-owned subsidiary are not sub
ject to shareholder approval. 1 1 0
The third change, consistent with the general tenor of the
Ne w MB CA, is that for those transactions subject to shareholder
ap proval, only a majority of votes entitled to be cast, rather than
tw o-thirds, is required absent contrary provisions in the
articles. 1 1 1
•oe

Id.§ 10.22(a). Consistent with the previous sections, such a bylaw adopted by the
s areholders may
contain a provision requiring a specified vote of either shareholders or
directors for any
change to be effective. In addition, any board action to change a
supermajority
bylaw provision must also comply with the greater of the existing or pro
posed standard.
Id. § 10.22(b)-(c). See supra text accompanying note 105.
107
Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 157. The converse, expressly provided in the statute,
18 that
no such approval was required for transfers made in the "usual and regular course
of busin ess."
Id. § 155.

�

•

. ••

see New MBCA, supra note 1, § 12.0l(a)(2), (b).
The requirement of shareholder approval of mortgages of property seems partic
ularly anom
alous in view of the board's unrestricted power to borrow without share
holde r action.
Hodge & Perry, supra note 9, at 384-85 (emphasizing expense and
elay caused by
requiring shareholder approval of mortgages). The requirement has been
eleted from
the Model Act since 1962. 3 REVISED MODEL BusJNESS CoRP. ACT ANN. 1321
(3d ed. 1985).
•••

See

�

llO
111

see New MBCA, supra note 1, § 12.01 (a)(3).
Id. § 12.02 (e). The procedure for authorizing sales or other dispositions not in
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Mergers and Share Exchanges

The New MBCA makes a number of highly significant
changes in current law dealing with corporate combinations:
elimination of the concept o f consolidations; introduction of cash
mergers and share exchanges to Mississippi; and liberalization of
the provisions on short-form mergers.
Chapter 11 of the New MBCA makes no mention of the
consolidation procedure provided by the Old M B C A . 1 1 2 This is a
rational omission: consolidations rarely occurred, since it is de
sired in most combination transactions that one of the constitu
ents survive. In any event, the practical effect o f a consolidation
can be achieved by the simple expedient of forming a new corpo
ration and merging the constituents into it. 1 13
Of much greater practical importance is the availability of
the cash merger as a means o f eliminating shareholders from the
combined business. Under the Old MBCA cash mergers were
impermissible, since the general merger statute required that the
plan of merger state the basis for "converting the shares of each
merging corporation into shares or other securities or obliga
tions of the surviving corporation or any other corporation . "114
Thus, with the exception of short-form mergers of subsidiar
ies, 1111 a merger could not be used as a "cash-out" device in Mis
sissippi. The New MBCA, however, allows the shares of the con
stituents to be converted as well "into cash or other property in
whole or part."116 This gives management an enormous element

the regular course of business is essentially the same as for amendments to the articles,
discussed at notes 97-99 supra and accompanying text. See New MBCA, s upra note 1, §
12.02(0-(g).
T�o other features of the new law should be briefly noted. The first is that the
board is e�powered to abandon any transaction once approved without further share
.
holder action (without, of course, prejudicing any contractual rights of third parties).
.
The other is that transactions which involve a transfer of assets but which actually serve
the purpose of a distribution (e.g., a "spin-off'' or other divisive reorganization) are gov
erne by the rules on distributions. Id. § 12.02(0-(g).
1 �ee Old MBCA, supra note
1, § 143. In a traditional consolidation, two or more
�orporatlons would combine to form a third, new corporation, i.e., neither of the combin·
.
mg corporations would survive.
m REVISED Mo DEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT Ch. 11, Introduc
tory Comment (1984).
114
See Old MBC�, supra note 1, § 141(c) (emphasis added
).
m Id. § 149; see infra notes 128-29
and accompanying text.
110
See New MBCA• supra note 1, § l l.Ol(b)(3). Cash mergers were added to the

�
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of flexibility in the merger process. However, it likewise injects
into Mississippi law the highly volatile issue of whether a merger
intended to freeze out minority shareholders may constitute a
breach of fiduciary obligation by those in control.117 Since the
statute permits this procedure it is obviously not automatically
voidable; the appropriate standard of review is of course not ad
dressed by the statute and will be a matter with which Missis
sippi courts will ultimately grapple.
Even more innovative is the New MBCA provision for share
exchanges. This procedure, unknown to common law and tradi
tional statutes, was added to the Model Act in 1976 in order to
provide a direct means whereby a corporation being acquired
does not disappear but becomes a subsidiary of the acquiring
corporation.118 Under the Old MBCA this result could be accom
plished only by the so-called reverse triangular merger: the ac
quiring corporation forms a subsidiary in which it places securi
ties or cash; the subsidiary then merges with the target
corporation, which receives securities or cash of the parent for
its shares and ceases to exist. 119 The Old MBCA authorized the

Mode l Act in the 1969 revision. See 2 MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT ANN. § 71(c) (2d ed.
1971) (examines allowance of cashout mergers); Garrett, Merger Meets the Common
Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1509, 1515
(1985) [hereinafter Garrett] (discussion of impact of
allowing cash out mergers).
117
A useful summary of the recent cases (mostly from Delaware) on this issue is
found at 3 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. ANN. 1261-67 (3d ed. 1985). For further
background, see Herzel & Colling, Establishing Procedural Fairness in Squeeze-Out
Mergers After Weinberger v. UOP, 39 Bus. LAW. 1525 (1984) (discussion of current state
of procedural fairness standard) ; Berger & Allinham, A New Light on Cash - Out Merg
ers: Weinberger Eclipses Singer, 39 Bus. LAW. 1 (1984)(examination of evolution of
courts' treatment of mergers) ; Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections
on Recent Developments in Delaware Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982)(re
cent Delaware cases expand ability of dissident shareholders to challenge mergers);
Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions,
132 U. PA. L .
REv. 647 (1984)(general review of statutory and case Jaw limitations); Com
ment, Freez eouts
Under the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation Act: The Need for Pro
tec tio n of Mino
rity Shareholders From "Going Private" Transactions, 1985 U. ILL. L.
RE v. 679 ( 1 985
) (lim ited protection available to minority shareholders).
"" See Garrett, supra
note 1 16, at 1516. The equivalent of a share exchange has, of
course, always
been possible assuming the unanimous consent of the shareholders of the
�arget corporation; the
innovation of the new procedure is to permit this, like a merger,
m the abs
ence of unanimity.
118
For a somewhat more detailed description, see Norton, The Acquisition Process
a nd the Clo
sely-Held Corporation: Selected Legal Aspects, 36 MERCER L. REV. 567,577-
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reverse triangular merger by permitting conversion of shares of
the target into securities of "the surviving corporation or any

other corporation."120
Section 11.02 of the New MBCA again modernizes Missis
sippi law by providing a direct means to the same result: a plan
of share exchange, whereby the shares of the target are ex
changed for securities of the acquiring or any other corporation,
or cash or other property.121 The exchange is subject to all of the
procedural safeguards, including dissenters' rights, as a
merger.122
Procedurally, the plan of merger or share exchange, once
adopted, is submitted either to the shareholders of both corpora
tions (merger) or the acquired corporation (share exchange)123
for approval.124 Essentially the same steps for approval are re
quired as apply to amendments of the articles, including major
ity vote rather than two-thirds as under the Old MBCA, and
voting by voting groups under some circumstances.1211
The New MBCA diverges from prior law in specifying lim
ited circumstances in which the shareholders of the surviving
corporation need not approve a merger.126 In effect it is a de

minimis exception for instances in which the merger does not
significantly affect the survivor's shareholders; e.g. , the articles
of the survivor are not substantively changed, the shareholders
of the survivor hold the identical number of shares as before the

78 ( 1 985) [hereinafter Norton] (discussion of triangular mergers).
"0 Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 14l(c)(emphasis added). As previously noted, how
ev r, cash was not a permissible item of exchange. See supra notes 1 14- 15 and accompa
�
nying text.
111

See

New MBCA, supra note 1, § 1 1 .02 (b)(3).
The statute does not, of course, preclude the acquisition of another corporation's
shares through a voluntary tender offer or other consensual transaction. Id. § ll.02 (d) .
For additional background on share exchanges see Norton supra note 119 I at 581I
>
82.
1 11

'03 Therein lies, obviously, one of the advantages
of the share exchange: since the
nterests of he shareholders of the acquiring corporation
s are not directly affected, there
�
is no necessity for their approval of the acquisition.
11'
See New MBCA• supra note l, § 1 1 .03 (outlining procedure for approval of
merger or share exchange) .

�

•

111

Id. § l l .03(e)-(f).
article amendments).
.

11•

See

See

supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (procedure for

New MBCA, supra note 1, § l l .03(g).
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merger, and the shares issued as part of the merger do not in
crease the outstanding voting and participating shares of the
survivor by more than twenty percent. While this avoids the ne
cessity of a shareholder meeting for the survivor, it is probably
of limited practical significance. A shareholder's meeting can, in
any event, be avoided by a three-step transaction: the survivor
can create a wholly-owned subsidiary; it can cause the subsidiary
and target to merge; then , if desired, it can effect a short-form
merger of the subsidiary without a shareholder vote.127
As under the Old MBCA,138 the new statute provides for the
short-form merger of a substantially owned subsidiary without
any shareholder action. The major change effected by the New
MBCA is that the necessary ownership threshold is now ninety,
rather than ninety-five, percent.128
After approval of a plan of merger or share exchange by the
shareholders (or by the directors alone if shareholder action is
unnecessary) articles of merger or share exchange are filed with
the Secretary of State. 18° Consistent with the general approach
of the New MBCA, the articles are self-effectuating and no cer
tificate of merger is issued by the Secretary.
The provisions of the New MBCA involving the effects of a
merger or share exchange, and addressing combinations between
domestic and foreign corporations, do not materially differ from
the prior statute . is1

D.

Dissolution

The New MBCA provisions on dissolution do not, for the
most part, differ significantly from the old statute.132 In a few
See M ur phy, The New Vir inia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer, 20 U. Rieu. L.
g
REv. 67, 122
(1985) [hereinafter Murphy] (analyzing effect of not having shareholders
meeting on merg
er or share exchange).
128
see Old MBCA, supra note 1 § 149.
'
"• see New MBCA, supra note
1, § 11.04.
111

ISO

Id. § 1 1.05.
Compare Old MBCA, supra note l, §§ 151, 153, with New MBCA, supra note 1 ,
§ § 11. 06,
11. 07.
13 1

131

tors or
E.g. , plenary authority to effect a dissolution is still granted to incorpora
.
directors
of a corporation which has not issued shares nor commenced business. Com
�are O ld MB
C A, supra note 1, § 163, with New MBCA, supra note 1, § 14.01. In addi
tion, the p
rovisions on judicial dissolution are not materially different. Compare Old

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

296

[VOL. 57

respects, however, the new act makes important changes in the
prior law.
Regarding voluntary dissolution, the New MBCA alters pre
sent law in two ways. First, the New MBCA requires action of
both directors and shareholder to effect dissolution of an organ
ized corporation;133 the former provision for dissolution by unan
imous written consent of shareholders is now eliminated. 134
Thus, the formality of a board resolution will have to be ob
served in any dissolution of a corporation which has begun busi
ness or issued stock. Second, consistent with the preceding dis
cussions, dissolution now requires the consent of only a bare
majority of shares entitled to vote in the absence of a provision
in the articles increasing the threshold;136 the prior act, of
course, required a two-thirds affirmative vote. 1 36
Procedurally, the separate steps of filing an intent to dis
solve, followed by winding up of the corporate affairs and the
filing of formal articles of dissolution,137 are eliminated. Rather,
after dissolution, articles of dissolution will now be filed with the
Secretary of State, and the corporation will be deemed dissolved
as of their effective date.138 This, in turn, triggers the winding up
and liquidation of its business and affairs, the procedure for
which is outlined in section 14.05.139 The most significant proce
dural changes are in the area of liabilities. More detail is now
included involving notice to known creditors; this must be done
in writing and allow not less than 120 days for the filing of a
claim. Any such claim will be barred if the claimant fails to re
spond or to file an action to enforce a claim within 90 days of its

§§ 193, 195, with New MBCA, supra note l,
See New MBCA, supra note 1 , § 14.02.
See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 165.

MBCA, supra note 1,
1 33
1••

1 30

§ § 14.30, 14.3 1.

See New MBCA, supra note 1 , § 14.02(e). The board can also increase the required vote by so conditioning its submission to shareho
lders. Id. § 14.02(c).
•

1 38

1'1

•••
130

See Old MBCA, supra note 1 ,

Id. §§ 167{d), 169-173, 183-85.
See New MBCA, supra note 1 ,

.Id' . § 14.05.

§ 167(c).
§ 14.03.

This includes the collection of assets, disposition o f all property not
to be d istnbuted to shareholders, payment of
outstanding liabilities , distribution of the
.
rema �. nmg
p�opel'ty to shareholders, and such other acts
" n ecessary to wind up an d liqui
date its busi � ess a�d affairs." Id. § 14.05(a). The
statute also outlines those matters not
affected by dissolution per se, including
title to the corporation's property. Id. § 14.05(b).
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rejection by the corporation. 1 40
Perhaps more significant is the New MBCA's treatment of
unknown claims. The new act allows the corporation to publish
notice in a newspaper of general circulation providing a proce
dure for the filing of unknown or contingent claims, and a state
ment that any such claim will be barred if an action to enforce is
not filed within five years . 1 ' 1 This provision now provides, in ef
fect, a uniform statute of limitations for unknown or contingent
claims.142 Moreover, it effectively overrules Naugher v. Fox
River Tractor Company. 143 In that case, the court held under
section 209 of the Old M B CA that while a product liability ac
tion against a dissolved corporation arose at the time of manu
facture, it would not be barred until six years from the date of
injury,1" thereby creating virtually unlimited exposure for such
claims. 1 46
In the area of involuntary dissolution, two important
changes are made by the New MBCA. The first is an entirely
new set of provisions for a dministrative dissolution. The grounds
for dissolution by the Secretary of State now include failure to
pay franchise taxes or penalties; failure to file an annual report;
failure to maintain a registered office, or agent, or to notify the
Secretary of State of changes thereto; and the expiration of a
corporation's duration. 148 Given the largely ministerial nature of

�··

Id. § 14.06. The prior statute required that written notice be sent but did not
specify any san
ction for failure to respond. Old MBCA, s upra note 1, § 173(a). Rather,
such claims survi
ved for the period of the applicable statute of limitations. Id. § 209.
141
See New MBCA, supra note 1 , § 14.07. This would have the effect, after the five
year period, of
barring known claimants not receiving notice; claimants who filed a claim
bu� were not
paid; and contingent claims or those based on events occurring after disso
ution. Id. § 14.07.
If an action is timely filed, the corporation (to the extent of the assets
.
tt has retamed) or shareholders
(for their pro rata share or the amount of assets d'istri'buted to them,
whichever is less) can be held liable. Id. § 14.07(d).
1 42
Id. § 14. 07(c). Under the Old MBCA the limitation period varied according to
the nature
of the claim. See supra note 140.

�

ua

446 F.Supp. 1281 (N.D. Miss. 1977) .

... Id. at 1282- 83 (analyzing
Mississippi's general statute of limitations) .
'.·� Id. at 1283. See also New MBCA, supra note 1, § 14.07(c)(3). Presuming th�t the
.

s
� tte notice is pu�lished, any such claim would either be '.'contingent" (if th� m1ury
�!uinc
date
u
rred before dissolution) or "based on an event occurrmg after the effective
.
of dis
y the
solution" (if the
injury was incurred at that time), and thus would be barred b
Passage of five
years under New MBCA § 14.07(c)(3).
148
See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 14.20. Under the MBCA certain grounds would
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such vices, however, the statute also provides a fairly simple pro
cedure for reinstatement upon cure, together with a right of ju
dicial appeal from · any denial of reinstatement. 147
The other principal innovation of the New MBCA is the
power granted to a court conducting a proceeding for judicial
dissolution to appoint a custodian to manage its business as an
alternative to a liquidating receiver.1"8 Although the statute is
silent as to those factors to be weighed by the court in determin
ing whether a custodianship would be appropriate, presumably
it is intended as a less drastic alternative to liquidation and a
device to effect a resolution of the internal difficulties which
gave rise to the proceeding. 149 If nothing else, since the statute
allows the delegation of "all powers of the corporation through
or in place of its board of d irectors or officers" to the custo
dian, 160 this may provide the requisite impetus to a buy-out of
complaining shareholders or other voluntary settlement of the
underlying controversy. If appropriate, the court may also con
151
vert a custodianship to a receivership, and vice versa.

E.

Dissenters ' Rights

The traditional approach to dissenters' rights, as embodi ed
in the Old MBCA,1112 has been the subject of criticism both by
shareholder and management interests. For the shareholder who

have justified involuntary judicial dissolution through an action filed by the Attorney
General, or suspension of the corporation's charter by the Secretary of State. Old
MBCA, supra note 1, §§ 187-89. As a practical matter, however, few such actions were
purs�ed by the Attorney General, and the sanction of suspension (although theoretically
.
.
carr� i �g -:v1th it denial of the privilege of doing business) often failed to provide the
r�quisite im �etus f�r corrective action by a recalcitrant corporation's managers. The de
.
.
vice of administrative
dissolution is both more economically efficient and, at the same
.
time, may carry a connotation of seriousness that mere "suspensio n " did not.
For the procedure to be followed by the Secretary, including the requisite notice
.
penods,
see New MBCA, supra note 1 , § 14.21.
'" See New MBCA, supra note 1 § 14.22-14.23
.
'
••• Id § l4.32(a). The Old MBCA recognized only
the receivership concept. Old
·

MBCA, supra note l, § 195-97.
See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT. § 14.32
Official Comment (1984).
'"' New MBCA , supra note 1, § 14.32
(c)(2).

::

Id. § 14.32(d). For other matters involving the procedure for judicial dissolut ion,
.
see id. § § 14.3 1, 14.33.
1 61

See Old MBCA, supra note 1 , § § 159, lGl.
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objected to one of the enumerated transactions that triggered
163 this dissatisfaction was eminently under
dissenters' rights,
standable: the procedure for asserting them was highly complex,
thus subjecting the dissenter to the risk of losing his rights by
1
technical noncompliance, 64 and in any event involved the ex
pense of a court action to determine the " fair value" of his
shares if the parties could not agree. 1 66 In turn, that complexity

and expense created from management's perspective an inherent
potential for nuisance litigation motivated by settlement value,
or demands based upon unrealistic visions of a stock's worth. 1 "
Finally, the generally worded definition of " fair value" in the
statute offered no guidance as to how it should be determined.167
108
Id. § 159. Under the Old MBCA these included only (1) mergers and consolida
tions and (2) the sale or exchange of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets
other than in the ordinary course of business. Id.
10'
In brief, the Old MBCA demanded the following: (1) written objection by the
shareholder prior to or at the meeting where action was to be taken; (2) the shareholder
had to vote against the action; (3) the shareholder had to make written demand for pay
ment of the " fair value" of his shares within 1 0 days of the vote (15 days if a short-form
merge r); (4) if within 3 0 days thereafter the corporation and shareholder could not agree
on su ch fair value, then the corporation could, within 60 days of the transaction com
plained of, file an action to determine the fair value of his shares; °(5) if the corporation
failed to bring such an action within the 60 day period, then any shareholder could com
mence the action. In all events, the shareholder was required to deposit his share certifi
cates with the corporation within 20 days of his initial demand; failure to do so would
result in the termination of his rights
unless his failure was excused by a court "for good
and sufficient cause." Id. § 161.
�f course the corporation and shareholder might agree upon the question of valua
. n, m
tio
which instance payment was to be made within 90 days of the transaction. Id.
10�
Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act
Af!ect mg Dissen
ters' Rights, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1856 (1977)[hereinafter Dissenters '
Rights]. Under the
Old MBCA, the expense of a valuation proceeding was borne by the
corp oration unless the
court found that the refusal by the shareholder to accept the
corporation 's offer was
"arbitrary or vexatious or not in good faith," in which instance all
or part of the expense
could be taxed to the shareholder. In all events, each party had to
pay his own attorn
eys' fees. Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 161.
100
See nissenters
·
' Rights, supra note 155, at 1856.
"
T
he
most
commonl
y accepted procedure is the so-called "Delaware block
167
me�hod where the
are
three elements of value, i.e., assets, market value, and earnings,
assigned a desig
nated weight, and the amounts thereby determined are added to reach a
per sh are val
ue. Norton, supra note 119, at 585. A recent Mississippi case suggests an
emphas is on
historical earnings as the most significant component in the closely-held
business. Herna
ndo Bank v. Huff, 796 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1986). For general background
see, e.g. , Com
ment, Valuation of Shares in a Closely Held Corporation, 47 Miss. L.J. 715
0 976H exa
mination of factors used i n determining fair share value); Note, The Dissent-
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The drafters of the Model Act fundamentally restructured the
concept of dissenters' rights in 1977 to strike a more equitable
balance of competing policies.168 The New MBCA adopts the
Model Act approach, which broadly seeks to e ncourage the par
ties to compromise their d i fferences privately, with judicial ap
praisal a vailable only as a matter of last resort. 169 Technically
the statute changes prior law in se veral significant respects.
Initially, the New MBCA expands the scope of dissenters'
rights o ver the limitations pre viously imposed. 1 60 Dissenters'
rights now apply to mergers as to which the dissenter has a right
to vote ; short-form mergers where the dissenter owns shares of
the corporation which does not sur vive; share e xchanges if the
dissenter is a shareholder of the acquired corporation and has a
right to vote on the plan ; sales or exchanges of all or substan
tially all assets not in the ordinary course of b usiness (e xcluding
judicial sales and liquidation sales in which the proceeds are dis
tributed to shareholders within one year) ; amendments to the
articles that affect a dissenter's shares in any of five enumerated
ways; and other transactions as to which the articles, bylaws, or
board resolution provide dissenters' rights . 1 61 In addition, dis 
senters' rights are now e xtended to benefic i al shareholders as
2
well as shareholders of record.1 6
In another respect, however, the New MBCA is more re
stricti ve than the old law. Dissenters' ri ghts are now made the
exclusive remedy of a shareholder to whom the r i ghts accrue un-

ing Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 629 ( 1977 ) (ger.'lral discussion of
relevant factors in determining value of shares held by dissenting shareholder).
, .. See Dissenters' Rights, supra note 155, at 1856-57
.

'"' REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP AcT Ch. 13 Introductory Comment (1984).
'00

See supra note 153.

' "'. See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 1 3.02. The inclusion of article amendments

remedies perhaps the most glaring deficienc y
of the Old MBCA, under which, for exam
pl e, shares could b stripped f preferenc
es, redemption rights, or preemptive rights
?
�
.
.
without a right to dissent. Cf. id. § 13.02
(4).
r

••:.

Co r:ipare Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 3(g)(defining sharehold r as a holder of
"
e
ecord ) with New MBCA, supra note
1, § 13.01 (7) (defining shareho lder as "the record
shareholder or the benefic1·a1 shar eh oId
er " for purposes of dissenters' nghts prov1s10ns)
.
A 1988 amendment makes it
clear that " beneficial shareholders" include the beneficial
ers of share held by a voti g trust.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-1 3.01 (6) (Supp . 1988).
�
�
the mechamcs of the assertio n of
dissenters' right by a benefic ial owner, see id. §
13.03(b ).
·

�:;

·

·

·

·
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less the proposed action is "unlawful or fraudulent" as to either
the shareholder or corporation. 183 This aspect of the law is likely
to engender controversy. The rationale advanced by the drafters

of the RMA is that so long as a majority of shareholders approve
a

transaction, their decision should prevail against a minority in

terest which deems it unwise or disadvantageous even if a court
should side with the minority. 184 While logic supports this pro
position, it is defensible only if one assumes that the minority
shareholder is assured of a fair payment for his shares. Although
the question is certainly debatable, on balance by adopting the
broad unlawfulness or fraud exception the statute is probably
sufficiently flexible to alleviate any concerns that it unduly fa
vors majority interests. • H
While the overall goal of the New MBCA is to make the
assertion of dissenters' rights a more practicable remedy, it
should be noted that the e nforcement procedure has not by any
means been significantly simplified. The procedure is outlined in
sections 13.20 through 1 3.28. Initially, if a meeting is called to
consider an action triggering dissenters' rights, the notice of the
meeting must state this and be accompanied by a copy of Chap
ter 13 of the New MBCA. If the transaction does not require
shareholder approval then the corporation must notify the
shareholders of the action and send a dissenters' notice de
scribed in section 13. 22. 188
If the action requires a shareholder vote then the share
holder must give written notice of his intent to exercise dissent
ers' rights before the vote is taken and either vote against the

••• See New MBCA,
supra note l, § 13.02(b). Consistent with this approach, the
n?w statute also
forecloses the former right of a shareholder to dissent only as to part of
is sh res. See
Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 159. Such action is now permi�sible only in
�
hose mstances where
the shareholder acts as a nominee for several beneficial sharehold
ers, some of
whom do not wish to dissent. New MBCA, supra note 1, § 13.03(a) .
... REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS CoRP. Acr § 13.02 Official Comment 2 (1984).
tea
Wh'l
1 e eschewing any attempt at comprehensiveness, the RMA suggests act'10ns
.
.
In vwl?
tion of legal voting provisions, in violation of the articles, and those involving
ec tlon or
breach of fiduciary duties as examples of transactions not protected from
��
J�dicial interv
ention. Id. It should be noted that the clear trend is to make dissenters'
rights ex clu
sive. For a collection of statutes and cases on point, see 3 MoDEL BUSINESS
Coap, A CT ANN. 1372, 1374.2-13 77 (Supp. 1987).
.•• s
ee New MBCA, supra note l , § 13.20.

�

?
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action or abstain. Failure to do so results in the forfeiture of his
right to payment under Chapter 1 3. 167 Thus, as u nder prior law,
strict attention to question o f technical compliance is required.
Following the meeting and within 10 days, the corporation
must send a "dissenters' notice " to all shareholders who prop
erly asserted dissenters' rights. The notice must inter alia state
the time and place for demanding payment and tendering
shares, supply a form for demanding payment, and set a date
not less than 30 nor more than 60 days from the date of the
notice by which the demand for payment must be received. 168
Thereafter the onus is upon the recipient to demand payment
and deposit his shares pursuant to the terms o f the notice; again
his failure to comply will result in the loss o f his rights under
Chapter 1 3 . 169
Within 60 days after the deadline for demanding payment
and depositing shares, 170 the corporation is required to pay each
complying dissenter the amount estimated by the corporation to
be the fair value of his shares with accrued interest. The corpo
ration must transmit with the payment financial statements for
a fiscal year ended not more than 16 months prior to payment,
an explanation of the method used to determine fair value and
to calculate interest, a statement of the dissenters' rights under
section 13.28 if he is dissatisfied with the offer, and yet another
copy of Chapter 1 3. 17 1

tu
1

••

Id. § 13.21.
Id . § 13.22. The notice must also advise holders of uncertified shares of any re 

strictions that will be placed upon transfer after demand, and include a copy of Chapter
13. Of course, as to the latter one may legitimately question the !ayperson's abil ity to
understand such a complex statute, but clearly no harm is done by its inclusion.
1•• Id. § 12.23(a), (c). The statute makes it clear however
that the demanding
�hareholder retai�s all other rights as a shareholder unti his righ are cancelled or mod 
ified by effectuation of the transaction. Id. § 13.23(b)
.
1 10
See id. § 13. 26(a).
111
Id. § 13 . 25. Similar to the Old MBCA, the new act defines " fair value " as "the
value 0f the sha �es immediately before the
effectuation of the corporate action to which
.
.
the dissenter objects, excludmg
any appreciation or depreciat ion i n anticipation of the
.
corporate act10 n unless exclusion would be
inequitable ." Id. § 13.01(3). The drafters of
.
. however,
the RMA candidly
adrmt,
that this offers little guidance (other than tim ing) as
to the methodology to be employed in calculating
"fair value." REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT § 13.01 Official Comment 3 (1984).
See supra note 157 and accompanying
text.

i

�

If the corporation does not make the
required payment within the 60 day li mit it
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Should a shareholder be dissatisfied with the amount ten
dered, or if payment is not made by the corporation within the

60 day period, under section 13.28 the dissenter may within 30
days after payment is made transmit to the corporation his own
estimate of the fair value of his shares together with a demand
for that amount. Failure to do so waives his right to such
demand.112
Only if the parties fail to agree upon fair value after the
exhaustion of this procedure can they resort to judicial ap
praisal. The corporation must within 60 days after receiving de
mand under section 1 3 . 28 file an action to determine the fair
value of the dissenters' shares if no agreement is reached. Corpo
rate counsel should note well the importance of timing; failure to
file the action obligates the corporation to pay the demanded
sum. 1 73 All dissenters whose claims are unresolved are to be
joined, and the court is empowered to appoint and define the
responsibilities of appraisers. The dissenters are to receive judg
ment for the amount, if any, by which the court-determined fair
value, plus interest, exceeds the corporation's payment. 11•
Interestingly, the New MBCA is somewhat ambiguous as to
what a dissatisfied dissenter should do with the payment he re
ceives from the corporation if he intends to make a supplemen
tal demand under section 1 3.28. The only light that the RMA
comments shed upon the issue is that the statute is meant to
force the corporation to pay without taking advantage of any de
lay pending final agreement, thereby eliminating the leverage
that dilatory tactics would provide. Likewise, the shareholder is
to be afforded immediate use of the amount tendered.176 The
statutory formulation of judicial relief, i.e. , the difference be-

mu st ret urn the
certificates to the shareholder-' if thereafter the transaction complained
of is
. consu
mmated, the above procedure of notice and demand must be repeated New
MB CA , supra, not
e 1, § 13.26.
7 See
New MBCA, supra note l, § 13.28. The right to make his own estimate and
1 2
de and is
also provided if the corporation does not consummate the transaction of
�
whi ch he co
mplains, but fails to return his certificates or release transfer restrictions on
uncertificated
shares under section 13.2 6(a).
1 8
7 Id. § 13.
03(a). Under the Old MBCA no such sanction existed; rather it only
freed the dissen
ter to file the action. See supra note 154 .
174 Id § 13.3
0(c)-( e) .
·

175

·

RE VISED MOD EL BUSI N ESS CoRP. A<::r § 13.25 Official Comment (1 984).
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tween fair value and the corporation's payment, suggests that
the shareholder should be free to avail himself immediately of
the initial payment without risking a waiver of his rights. More
over, the statutory right to make the supplemental demand
should foreclose the addition of any "accord and satisfaction"
language to the corporation's check. Nonetheless, an explicit
statement of the shareholder's right to use the initial payment
pending resolution of his supplemental demand would be a de
sirable amendment to the new MBCA; absent this the prudent
dissenter negotiating a check tendered pursuant to section 13.25
might well include a reservation of rights in his endorsement.178
While the costs of the judicial proceeding, including ex
penses incurred by appraisers, are ordinarily borne by the corpo
ration, the statute grants broad discretion to the court to tax
such expenses to dissenters if it deems them to have acted arbi
trarily, vexatiously or in bad faith. Likewise, attorneys' fees can
be imposed upon either the corporation or dissenters if the court
finds that either party did not comply in good faith with the
provisions of Chapter 13.177
Only experience will show whether the new act accomplishes
the avowed goal of rendering dissenters' rights a more realistic
remedy. While the New MBCA is far clearer and better organ
ized than its predecessor, in frankness it has not simplified the
procedure for exercising dissenters' rights to any appreciable ex
tent. The same pitfalls exist as before for the shareholder who
lacks diligence in pursuing his rights, and it would be foolhardy
indeed for a dissenter not to engage the services of competent
counsel. On the other hand, procedural aspects aside, the statu
tory incentives for negotiated settlement - particularly
�andatory early payment by the corporation (as opposed to a
simple offer) and the right for dissenters to make a supplemen
tal demand - seem real and substantial. In this regard the New
MBCA represents a positive step towards more satisfactory reso
lution of these disputes.
118 Cf.
Miss. ConE ANN. § 75-1-207 (1972)(UCC provision for reservation or preser
.
vation of rights).
"' See New MBCA supra note 1, § 13.31 (a), (b). This discretion also extends to
requmn� that some dissenters contribute to the
attorney's fees of other dissenters if they
substantially benefitted from the services perform
ed by the latter. Id. § 13.31(c).
•

•

.

.
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CLOSE CORPORATIONS

IV.

A.

Introduction

The overwhelming majority of Mississippi corporations are
closely held, and surely there is no debate that such entities are
different, not just in degree but in kind, from the public corpo
ration. One of the d ominant themes in corporate scholarship and
legislation, at least since the mid-1950's, has been the attempt to
respond effectively to problems peculiar to the close corpora
tion.178 General corporation statutes have commonly adapted to
meet some of the needs of close corporations, but traditional
statutes such as the Old MBCA have proven deficient in many
particulars. Moreover, while judicial recognition of the special
nature of the close corporation has increased in recent years , 179
this trend has not been universal, particularly in instances where
shareholder control over board discretion has been involved.180
Clearly, additional statutory "safe harbors" are desirable to fa
cilitate effective planning where variations of the statutory

118

Some common examples are (1) supermajority vote and quorum provisions; (2)

provision for informal shareholder or director action by unanimous consent or conference
telephone call; (3) broad powers of delegation to board committees;

(4)

broad power to

restrict transfers of shares; (5) authorization of voting trusts; (6) provisions for one incor
porator; (7) provision for fewer than three directors; and (8) broader provisions for disso
lution, e.g., by unanimous shareholder consent. Miller, Illinois Close Corporations: Anal

ysis of the New Act, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 587, 601 (1978). Of these it is noteworthy that
the Old MBCA had no provision

as

to

(4),

(6), or (7), and as

to (2)

did not recognize

conference telephone calls as a permissible means of shareholder or director action. Old
MBCA, supra note 1.
178

Perhap s the best-known example is Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.
2d 505, 515-1 6 (Mass. 1975),
which states that shareholders in a close corporation owe
one anothe r substantially the same fiduciary duties as partners.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has followed this trend in an important recent deci
sion involving issues of authority. In Baxter Porter & Sons Well Servicing Co. v. Venture
Oil Corp., 488 So. 2d 793, 796 (Miss. 1986), the court equated the authority of a share
holder, executive officer and director of a close corporation to that of a partner in a

partnership as to matters that constitute carrying on the usual business of the corpora
tion. Cf. Miss. ConE ANN. §
79-12-17(a) (Supp. 1987)(authority of partnership as agent for
partnership). While
the result reached in Baxter Porter, i.e., binding the corporatio n to
acts undertaken by such a person without formal board approval, is not surprising, the
court's candid admission that the pristine rules of agency simply should not apply in the
c ose corporation
setting is a praiseworthy move towards more honest and realistic deci
sionmaking in this area
.
180
See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.

�
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model are appropriate. Paradoxically, though, the Old MBCA
reflected a large corporation orientation.181
The recent response to this need has been broadly twofold:
in some states, the enaction of special "close corporation" stat
utes either as a supplement or alternative to the general corpo
ration statute;182 in others, the addition of special provisions of
particular significance to the close corporation to a general cor
poration statute. The RMA, from which the New MBCA was de
rived, takes the latter approach.183 I believe this is fundamen
tally sound,184 and certainly the New MBCA is a vast
improvement over its predecessor. Nonetheless, there remain

181

See Part One, supra note 3, at 170 n. 15.

,.. These statutes generally adopt criteria for classification a s a statutory close cor
poration, and a set of special rules applicable only to such corporations. For an extensive
discussion of such statutes, see 1 H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § l. 14b (2d ed. 1971 &
Supp. 1987) [hereinafter O'NEAL]. A list of states with integrated close corporation provi
sions can be found at 4 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr ANN. 1868 (3d ed. Supp. 1987).
188

In 1981, the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws first promulgated

supplement to the Model Act, presenting

an

a

proposed

integrated close corporation statute. See

Committee on Corporate Laws, Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model
Business Corporation Act, 37 Bus. LAw. 269 (198l) (results o f committee's work). The
Supplement was formally adopted with amendments in 1983. See Committee on Corpo
rate Laws, Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business. Corporation
Act, 38 Bus. LAW. 1031 (1983)(detailing adoption of amendments). The current text can
be found at 4 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 1803-1862 (3d ed. 1985). The Supplement
was, however, not proposed by the Task Force

as

a part of the Business Law Reform

legislative package. For a summary and critique of the Supplement, see Kessler, The
ABA Close Corporation Statute, 36 MERCER L. REv. 661 (1985).
11• A
uthor's Note: The debate over the desirability of integrated close corporation
statutes is of long standing, and I will make no effort to resolve it here. A useful sum
mary of the arguments pro and con is found in O'NEAL, supra note 182, §§ l . 1 3- l.14(c). I

h�ve bee� �onvinced by those who argue that a well-drafted general incorporation act
with prov1s10ns that respond to basic close corporation issues offers sufficient flexibility
to planners without the necessity for the creation of an arbitrarily defined "statutory

close corporation." A well-reasoned statement of this proposition is Karjala, A Second
.
Look at Special
Close Corporation Legislation, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1207 ( 1 980)[ hereinafter
d
Karjala]. It is noteworthy that Florida, which adopted one
o f the pioneering integrate
.
close corporat10n acts, subsequently repealed
it.
Perhaps more germane is whether it is rational
to maintain artificial demarcations

�etw�en the partnership and corporation in the small business setting. The ultimate goal

this area more appropriately might be a new
unified small business form combining
the most desirable features of the laws of partnership
s and corporations. For a discussion
of this question, see Haynsworth, The Need
for a Unified Small Business Legal Struc
tur:, 33 Bus. LAW. 849 (1978). This, however,
nt
goes beyond the scope of the prese
article.
m
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some problem areas which the new act does not address, and to
which the legislature should give close attention in the future.
Before dealing with those issues, however, I will discuss the ma
jor innovations of the New MBCA.

B.

Share Trans{er Restrictions.

The Old MBCA did not directly validate restrictions on the
transfer of shares, thus leaving the efficacy of such devices to be
determined by judicial precedent.1H The New MBCA greatly
improves the law by explicitly authorizing share transfer restric
tions and delineating the types of restrictions which may be
permissible.
Under section 6.27, transfer restrictions are authorized to
maintain a corporation's status where determined by the num
ber of its shareholders (e.g., an election under Subchapter S of
the Internal Revenue Code), to preserve a securities law exemp
tion , or for " any other reasonable purpose. "186 The types of re
strictions authorized by the statute are (1) rights of first refusal,
(2) obligations to purchase restricted shares, presumably upon
the occurrence of some contingency, (3) consent provisions if not
"manifestly unreasonable," and (4) disqualifications of certain
p u r c h asers ( e .g . ,
compet i t o r s )
i f n o t " m a n i fe s t l y
unreasonable. " 1 87
180

The leading case was Fayard v. Fayard, 293 So. 2d 421 (1974), which adopted the
rule that transfer restrictions in close corporations would be sustained if determined to
be "reasona ble in the light of the relevant circumstances." Id. at 423. The court went on
to enumerate the factors to b e considered as including: ( 1 ) size of the corporation, (2)
degree of the restraint, (3) duration of the restraint, (4) method of fixing share value, (5)
relation of the restraint to corporate objectives, (6) the threat posed by a hostile share
holder, and (7) the likelihood that the restriction would serve the corporation's best in
tere st. Applying this test the court held that a restriction i n a family corporation requir
ing consent of all shareholders to any transfer was valid as to transfers outside of the
f�m ily but invalid as to intrafamily transactions. Id. at 424. One might, however, ques
tion the court's premise that transfers to third parties would be inherently more disrup
tiv e and prone to create
disharmony than transfers to other family members.
186

See New MBC A, supra note 1, 6.27(c). Of course this still leaves the definition of
such "reason able purposes"
ultimately in the hands of courts, but there is a substantial
body of caselaw
nationwid e from which guidance can be drawn. For a collection and
sum m ary of cases,
see 1 MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT ANN. 432-443 (3d ed. Supp. 1987).
117
See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.27(c). Consent restrictions have been particu
larly risky at commo
n law, despite the Fayard court's acceptance in the family corpora-
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The usefulness of share transfer restrictions, both for con
trolling entry to and exit from a business venture and for pro
viding liquidity of investment, are well known and need not be
repeated here. In light of the preceding discussion of dissenters'
rights, however, one might note a particular advantage that such
provisions can serve in the closely-held corporation as a contrac
tual alternative to Chapter 13. A provision mandating the buy
out of a minority interest upon the occurrence of some condition
can not only be extended beyond the statutory events triggering
dissenters' rights, but also has the advantage of allowing the
parties to fix the price of shares in advance o f any dispute and
thereby avoid the possible necessity of judicial appraisal.
The statute permits transfer restrictions in either the arti
cles, bylaws or separate contracts; of course those owning shares
prior to the adoption of a restriction are bound only if they vote
for it or become parties to the contract. In order to be enforcea
ble against third party transferees the restriction must be con
spicuously legended on the front or back of a certificate.188

C.

Shareholders' Agreements.

While the Old MBCA had no provisions on shareholders'
agreements other than fo rmal voting trusts, 189 the common law
generally recognized the validity of agreements among share
holders dictating how they would vote their shares.190 Rather,
problems

the

so-called

with

encountered

"pooling

agree

ments"191 have generally been of two types. T h e first is to fash-

tion context. See, e.g., Rafe v. Hindin, 29 App. Div. 2d 481 , 288 N.Y.S. 2d 662, 663-64
( 1968)(restriction which did not provide that consent would not be unreasonably with
hel� was invali restraint on alienation). Of course, even where such a restriction was
validly entered mto, a court might refuse to enforce it if consent is wrongfully withheld,
e.g., as a means of forcing a sacrifice sale.
ee New BCA, supra note 1, § 6.,27 (a), (b). This is likewise necessary under
.
the
ssissipp i Uniform Commercial Code. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 75-8-204 (1972).
See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 65.
See, e.g., E_.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert,
157 Neb. 867, 881 , 62 N.W. 2d 288,
302 ( l S4)(upholdmg agreement by majority
and minority stockholders to vote their
shares m such a way as to maintain equal board
representation) .
'01
It should be emphas1zed th at this d1scuss10
n deals only with agreements respect.
mg matters as to which shareholders are competen
t to act primaril y the election of di
rectors. Agreements by shareholders encroaching
upon boa d authority are dealt with at

�

18� �
�:

�

•••

�

·

·

·

·

�
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ion an appropriate enforcement mechanism. 192 An irrevocable
proxy to an arbitrator o r non-defaulting shareholder would seem
an obvious answer. In those states without specific statutory au
thorization for irrevocable proxies, however, one would have to
argue that it was rendered irrevocable as a proxy coupled with
an interest.193 This was not clearcut by any means. Moreover, it
bore upon the second problem, i.e. , whether a pooling agreement
might be invalidated as constituting a voting trust that did not
comply with statutory requirements.194 Clearly, statutory defini
tion of the acceptable parameters of such agreements is the pref
erable approach.
The New MBCA responds to both concerns. Section 7.31
grants broad authority for shareholders to enter into agreements
defining "the manner in which they will vote their shares. " 1911
The statute makes such agreements specifically enforceable, and

infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
1 92
The classic case was Ringling v. Ringling Bros. Barnam & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc., 29 Del. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1946), modified, 29 Del. 610, 53 A.2d 441
0 947), in which the parties agreed that in the event of a disagreement, the matter would

be submitted to an arbitrator whose decision would be binding. Since the agreement did

not provide a right for the arbitrator to actually vote a defaulting party's shares, how

ever, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancellor's decision to imply a proxy.
Thus, the Supreme Court remedied the breach by refusing to count the defaulters'
shares in the election of directors. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, without the defaulter's

votes the plaintiff was outvoted by a competing shareholder, who thereby gained control
of the corporation. Ringling, 29 Del. at 614, 53 A.2d at 244. See Note, Specific Enforce

ment of Shareholder Voting Agreements, 15 U. Cm. L. REV. 738 (1947)(specific enforce
me nt of unobjectionab
le voting agreements desirable as matter of public policy) .
193

Prior Mississippi law had no express provision for irrevocable proxies. See Old
MBCA, supra note 1, §
63.
194

Again the classic case came from Delaware. In Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del.
3 71, 130 A. 2d 338
(1957), the court struck down an "Agent's Agreement" under which
shareholders dep
osited their shares with agents who were granted irrevocable proxies to
vo the shares
for a period of ten years. Id. at 376, 130 A. 2d at 344. The court held that
�
this was a secret
voting trust that violated the requirements of the voting trust statute.
Id. In distingu
ishing this arrangement from the valid pooling agreement in Ringling, the
court emphasized
inter alia the absence of irrevocable proxies in Ringling. Id. at 377-78,
130 A. 2d at 345-4
6. Abercrombie was subsequently overruled in substance by the Dela
ware Legisla
ture, see DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(c), (e)(l968), and the Delaware Su
p reme Court
has apparently retreated somewhat from its rigorous application. See
Oceanic Exploration
Co. v. Grynberg, 428 A.2d 1, 6-7 (Del. 1981)(voting trust provisions
hi
ch
w
ere
�
part of broad agreement of corporate reorganization were not subject to vot
ing trust statute
restrictions).
10•
See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 7.3l(a).
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provides that proxies granted by parties to such agreements are
irrevocable.196 Finally, the act specifically excludes such agree
ments from the voting trust statute, section 7 .30. 197
On the other hand, it must be emphasized that these sec
tions do not govern shareholder control agreements that affect
the discretion of the board of directors. Under the 1988 amend
ments, the New MBCA now conforms to the RMA and allows a
corporation with fifty or fewer shareholders to dispense entirely
with the board of directors and be governed by its shareholders
in the fashion of partnerships.198 Absent this right of direct
shareholder management, planners must draft cautiously any
provisions that seek to control the board's powers of manage
ment lest they run afoul of common-law resistance to such at
tempts.199 While courts have tended recently to view such agree
ments more favorably,200 even unanimous shareholder agreement

, .. Id. §§ 7.22(d) (5), 7.31(b).

Id. § 7 . 3 1 ( a) . The voting trust provisions d o not materially differ from prior law.
Bus1NESS CoRP.
m Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.0l(c) (Supp. 1988); see REVISED MooEL
4
Acr § 8.0l(c) (1984). This issue is also discussed in Part One, supra note 3, at 183-8
n.68. The legal impediment to this originally was s ection 194 of the Mississi ppi Constitu·
tion, which could have been interpreted as requiring a board of directors for all corpora
117

tions. As previously noted, section 194 has since been repealed.

See supra

note 36.

Of course, the 50 shareholder limit is subject to the criticism of arbitrariness, but
since it appears in the RMA it has the merit o f uniformity.

"' See, e.g. Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174,
175-76, 77 N.E.2d 633, 634-35 (1948)(agreement delegating management powers to ma
jority shareholder for 19 years "completely sterilized" board and was therefore against

public policy) ; McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 325-26, 189 N.E. 234, 236-37
(1934)(agreement providing inter alia that shareholders would occupy certain offices and
be paid fixed salaries was invalid attempt to control board where non-party minority

But see Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 412, 199 N.E. 641, 643
(1936)(slight invasions of powers of directorate by shareholders is permissible whe re all
shareholders are parties and creditors are not threatened) .
• 10
0 T
he leading case is probably Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N . E . 2d 5 77 (1 964),
whic upheld an agreement between two shareholders owning 208 of 220 shares that
requued the payment of annual dividends and fixed salaries to their wives for five years
after the death of a signatory shareholder. Id. at 27, 203 N.E. 2d at 587. The court for

interest existed).

?

�

mu ated the applicable test as no public injury, no complaining minority interest, and no
.
prei udice to credit.ors. Id. at 25, 203 N.E. 2d at 585. Again, however, even Galler cannot
.
be interpreted as meaning that "anything goes" if all shareholde
rs agree. See e.g.,
Somers v. AAA Temporary Services, Inc., 5 Ill. App.3d
931, 932-33, 284 N.E. 2d 462, 464·
65 (1972)(voi ing bylaw amendment passed by shareholders rather than dire ctors ; held
that Galler did not permit direct contravention of statute).

�
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cannot guarantee that such agreements are immune to attack. 20 1
Unfortunately, the range of judicially permissible options re
mains murky at best.
From a policy perspective it would seem that shareholders
of a close corporation, acting unanimously, should have the same
freedom to order and manage their affairs by agreement as part
ners of general partnerships have, without regard to the artificial
distinctions of shareholders and directors. 202 This flexibility can
now be achieved in Mississippi under the amended New
MBCA;203 however simply providing for direct shareholder man
agement for a qualified corporation does not obviate the need
for carefully structured control agreements analogous to those
utilized in partnerships. As with partners such matters are ap
propriately governed contractually, not through a statutory
model which is simply unrealistic in most close corporations.

D.

Dissention and Deadlock

It is in the area of remedies for deadlock that the New
MBCA is perhaps most deficient. As previously discussed, the
act now allows a court to appoint a custodian to manage the af
fairs of a solvent corporation, which is certainly an improvement
over prior law.20• However, the grounds for judicial dissolution
under section 14.30 are basically the same as under prior law,
requiring a showing of irreparable harm in the event of director
deadlock, shareholder deadlock preventing election of directors
for two years, "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" actions of direc
tors or majority shareholders, or misapplication or waste of as
sets. 206 Thus the new act does not include more liberal provi
sions of some modern statutes allowing, e.g. , dissolution where
the business cannot function to the benefit of shareholders gen201

The Long Park decision is a frequently cited example. See supra note 199.
See Bradley, Toward A More Perfect Close Corporation - The Need for More
a �d Improved
Legislation, 54 GEO. L. J. 1145, 1183 (1966)(close corporation should pro
vi de for validity
of unanimous agreements affecting management on control of
corp oration).
202

201
20•

206

See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 14.30(2).
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erally or pursuant to any provision in the articles. 206 Given the
traditional disinclination of courts to order dissolution and the
stringency of such standards as irreparable injury, fraud, oppres
sion, and waste, the statute is arguably an inadequate response
to the plight of the minority shareholder who may find himself
locked into an inviable investment without the "Wall Street Op
tion" of public corporation shareholders to sell in a waiting
market.
The problem of illiquidity of the close corporation invest
ment, particularly a minority interest, is probably the most vex
ing one still facing legislators and close corporation planners.
The "liquidation right"207 of partners in a general partnership,
even one constituted for a term,208 simply is not part of the cor
porate model. While the appropriate statutory response has
been much debated, I would favor the approach of authorizing
provisions in the articles of smaller corporations (to be consis
tent, those with fifty or fewer shareholders) granting any share
holder, or holders of a specified number or percentage of shares,
the option to cause dissolution at will or upon the occurrence of
a specified event or contingency.209 While this may be criticized
as giving individual shareholders too much leverage over the ma
jority, it simply approximates the partnership model and, in any
event, would be subject to arms-length negotiation at the time of
incorporation. Such a statute should require unanimous consent
of shareholders to any amendment of the articles to provide the
right, and for legending share certificates to p rotect innocent
purchasers. So long as all parties approach the issue with eyes
open, this seems a preferable alternative to the risks run by mi
nority shareholders without such a cash-out option . 2 1 0

•
•• E.g., S.C CODE

§ 33-21-1 50 (1976) .
This was the term coined by Professor Bromberg. Bromberg, Partnership Disso
.
lutio
� - Causes, Consequences, and Cur s , 43 Tux. L. REV. 631, 647 (1965).
• •
se� Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-12-75 (Supp. 1987)(Mississippi Uniform Partnership
_
Act prov1s1
on on withdrawal of partners).
109
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (a)(l968) (allows stockholders option to dis
solve corporation at will or upon specifi ed
event or conting ency).
210
ut
Of course, the minority can also be protected
in the event of dissent by buy-o
agreements, hut hese presuppose both the
willingness of majority share hold ers to as
.
me this bhgation
and th: financial ability to follow through. O n the other hand, it
�
.
e
uld be dismgenuous to thmk that "at-will
dissolution" will not i n some instances b
'01

e

See, e.�.,

�:

�
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MISCELLANEOUS

Foreign Corporations

The New MBCA provisions on foreign corporations211 do
not merit extensive discussion. There is, however, one important
change in the area o f qualification to do business. As is well
known, the "door closing" provision of the Old MBCA,212 which
denied access to state courts to foreign corporations that trans
acted business in Mississippi without a certificate of authority,
was narrowly constru ed by the Mississippi Supreme Court to
preclude a corporation from suing on any cause of action that
arose prior to qualification. Subsequent qualification would not
retroactively cure the defect. 2 13 This punitive rule is reversed by
the New MBCA, which expressly provides that a foreign corpo
ration transacting business without a certificate of authority
cannot bring an action in state court "until it obtains a certifi
cate of authority," and allows a court to stay any proceeding un-

used as a leverage device in negotiations between dissenting factions.
It should be noted that the suggested approach is by no means the most radical one
that has been advanc ed. It does
not, for example, protect the shareholder who does not
barga in for and obtain the right to dissolve at will. In an important article, Professors

Hetherington and Dooley advocated that this gap be closed statutorily by granting any
minority shareholder in a
close corporation the right to force the corporation to purchase
all his shares at their
fair value, so long as this would not render the corporation insol
�ent. This right would also be nonwaivable after two years from incorporation. Hether
ington & Dooley, Illiquidi
ty and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the
�emaining Close Cor por
ation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 50-52 ( 1 977). While provoca
ti�e, I do not view
this as a workable proposal at this time. For other criticisms, see
illman, The
Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Considera
tio n of the Rel
ative Permanence of Pa rtnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L.

�

�Ev. 1, 69-75 ( 1982)
(q uestioning assumptions upon which advocation of at will dissolu
tion by minority shareh
olders is based).
211

212
213

See New MBCA, supra note 1, Chapter 15.
see 0Id MBCA, supra note 1, § 247.

Parker v. Lin-Co. Producing Co., 197 So. 2d 228, 230 (Miss. 1967). This, of
course, was contrary
to the general rule in other states. See Dunn-Cooper, An Analysis
of ississipp
i's Treatment of Foreign Corporations, 55 Miss. L. J. 259, 261-62 (1985)(ex
ammation of Miss
issippi's rule ).
Ironically, the
Mississippi Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion as to for
.
eign limited
partnerships, holding that qualification applied retroactively. MISS CAL
2o4 , L td. v. U
pchurch, 465 So.2d 326 330 (Miss. 1985)(construing Miss. CooE ANN. § 791 3-213 (l)(S upp.
1987), repealed, 1987 Miss. Laws ch. 448, § 1 105).

�
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til the foreign corporation obtains the certificate. 2 1 4

B.

ConfUcts of Interest

While director conflicts of interest were discussed exten
sively in Part One of this Article,2111 one aspect of the New
MBCA as enacted deserves additional comment. I previously ad
vocated the adoption of a statute modeled after Illinois law and
the Exposure Draft of the RMA explicitly providing that direc
tor or shareholder ratification of a conflict of interest transaction
did not validate it for all purposes, but simply shifted the bur
den of proof on the ultimate issue of fairness to those attacking
the transaction. The Legislature, however, adopted the approach
of the RMA, with one modification: shareholder ratification re
quires the vote of two-thirds of eligible shares, rather than a
majority. 2 16
I believe that the Legislature intended to enact only a sav
ings statute that defines the burden of proof of fairness , but
does not otherwise validate an unfair transaction. However, this
provision - while apparently adopted with the salutary objec
tive of making ratification logistically more difficult-may ulti
mately yield an undesirable result. By increasing the requisite
percentage for ratification, the statute may b e susceptible to a
construction that the more onerous vote requirement should
thereafter shield the transaction from judicial review. For rea
sons I have already discussed in Part One at length, I do not
believe that this is sound policy. Thus I would urge the Legisla

ture to correct this ambiguity in the New MBCA by express pro
vision that it is intended only to shift the burden of proof, not to
imbue a conflict of interest transaction with absolute validity. 2 1 7

:::

See New MBCA, supra note l, § 15.02 (a), (c)(emph sis added).
a
See Part One, supra note 3, at 202-11 (discussion of duty of loyalty).
"' See New MBCA, supra
note 1, § 8.31 (d).
211
e
I n fairness I should note that this is clearly not the
position n o w adopted by th
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws. The most recent
amendme nt to the RMA proposed
by the Committee is a new Subchapter F governing
directors' conflict of interest transac
l•_ ons. Among other things the proposed
amendment would absolutely prohibit any judi
.
cial
�ttack on a transaction that was approved by either the board or shareholders ac
cording to statutorily prescribed procedur
es. See Committ ee on Corporate Laws,
.
Ch ? nges 1�
the Model Business Corporation Act
Direc
- Amendm ents Pertaining to
tor s Confi1ctmg Interest Transaction s,
43 Bus. LAW. 691 (1988 ).

CORPORATE LA W REFORM

1987]

C.

315

Cumulative Voting

Part One of this article advocated the elimination of
mandatory cumulative voting. : u s Thus it is satisfying to note
that, with the repeal of section 1 94 of the Constitution,2 1 9 the
Legislature has now amended the new Act to make cumulative
voting permissive, although the right to cumulate applies unless
eliminated by the articles. 220
VI.

CONCLUSION

The 1987 Mississippi Business Corporation Act undoubt
edly represents a substantial improvement over its predecessor.
Nonetheless, as both Parts of this Article have attempted to il
lustrate, there is much room for further refinement of the stat
ute, and the experience of the bench and bar will undoubtedly
expose even more areas which need legislative attention. One
hopes that the Mississippi Legislature's history of "benign neg
lect" of the 1 962 MBCA will not be indicative of its attitude
towards our new Act; the 1988 amendments are an encouraging
sign to the contrary.22 1 In any event, the sweeping changes that
it has already effected sound a call to immediate attention by
Mississippi corporate practitioners.

218

210

220

Part One, supre note 3, at 228-31.
See supra note 36.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 7 9 -4-7. 28(b) ( Supp. 1 988). A conforming amendment was also

made to section
8.08, dealing with director removal.
The 1988 amendments also now permit, inter alia, directors to fill vacancies in the
board , unl
es prohibited by the articles. Miss. ConE ANN. § 79-4-8.10 (a ) (2) (Supp. 1988) .
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